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Abstract
The Antarctic continent and surrounding waters are the site
of a unique international dilemma. Krill, a small shrimp-
like crustacean, is the focus of this problem. Krill playa
major role in the short Antarctic food chain. Marine fauna
in the area depend heavily on krill either directly or in-
directly for their livelihood. Krill are a main food item
for fish, squid, penguins, Crabeater Seals, Leopard Seals
and the Fin, Blue, Sei, Humpback, and Minke Whales. Animals
such as the Killer and Sperm Whales and other seals are only
one step removed in the food chain.
Human interest in krill as a potential source of protein and
income has been on the increase. Japan, the Soviet Union and
the Federal Republic of Germany are engaged in exploratory
fishing and the development of markets for krill. Taiwan,
Chile, and the Republic of Korea plan to do the same. Un-
fortunately, little 1s known about proper management tech-
niques for a resource which occupies such a low and important
trophic level.
The problem is augumented by the fact that seven nations
(Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and
the United Kingdom) have laid claim to sovereignty over portions
of the Antarctic continent. These seven states, along with
Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and
i
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the United States, are party to the present governing instru-
ment for the Antarctic continent - The 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
The Treaty has effectively "arrested" the claims issue.
However,a possible international approach to krill management
is viewed by the seven claimants as a threat to their "sover-
eignty" over Antarctic territory. states not bound by pro-
visions of the Treaty have expressed interest in benefit from
the krill harvest. Differences of opinion over this juridical
issue will hinder any attempt at international management of
krill.
The potential krill harvest necessitates the development of
some mechanism for the purpose of rational management. The
Antarctic Treaty does not treat the subject of commercial
exploration and exploitation and may be of little use in
krill management decisions. The impact of the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea and of the Informal Compo-
site Negotiating Text is also open to question. Until the
status of the waters within 200 miles of the Antarctic conti-
nent is determined, the applicability of these international
agreements is subject to various interpretations.
The International Whaling Commission, Food' and ,Agricultural
Organization, and Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
have been noticeably active with respect to Antarctic marine
living resources. These organizations may play important
iii
roles within a new resource management regime. Several
management approaches are available to the international
community. Opinions differ, however, as to the most appro-
priate combination of states and organizations for a new
regime. For most effective management, a new regime should
not be restricted to the thirteen Antarctic Treaty Consulta-
tive Parties, but should be open to all actively interested
nations. States (most especially less-developed-countries)
without the means to develop an Antarctic fishery or scientific
program may be represented through strong institutional rela-
tionships between the international organizations mentioned
and a new regime to be established.
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Chapter I
Introduction
This study pertains to the problem afinternational activity
in an area of political and ecological sensitivity, the
Southern Ocean. Of specific concern is the question of
which group of states should have a voice in management of
Antarctic krill. The niche filled by krill within the
ecosystem and its potential as a fishery is discussed.
Past international practice has been affected for the most
part by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which has maintained
a somewhat exclusive "club" of nations as the overseers of
Antarctic activity. However, states not party to the 1959
Treaty are becoming interested in the possible benefits of
a krill fishery.
A major point of contention evolves from the fact that seven
nations have laid claim to sovereignty over sections of the
Antarctic continent. Several of these nations assume that
they also have exclusive rights over the %ishery resources
within 200 miles of the coast. The Antarctic Treaty has
put the juridical question in a temporary limbo by refusing
to recognize or not recognize any of the claims. The status
of the various claims has yet to be resolved. Therefore,
the status (i.e. high seas, exclusive economic zones, contiguous
zones, territorial seas, or internal waters) of the waters
1
2surrounding the continent is also open to question. Since
the nature of the waters is undetermined, applicability of
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the Sea, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, and the potential impact of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text is also unsettled. Tensions
between the territorial security envisioned by the claimants
and "freedom of the seas" advocated by the non-claimants
will be difficult to resolve. The juridical problem plays
a significant role with respect to the questions of resource
acquisition and environmental protection. Reference to high
seas within the Southern Ocean is illade throughout this study
with these points in mind.
Several international organizations (i.e. FAO, lWC, and SCAR)
carry out activities which are important with regard to
Antarctic marine living resources. Discussion of the functions
of these various organizations shows that they will be im-
portant assets to rational management of Antarctic krill.
Four possible options open to the international community
are addressed. These options are not exclusive, but were
chosen for their applicability and the fact that they are the
most widely discussed. Conclusions concerning membership in
a regime for management of Antarctic krill are, thereby,
supported.
Chapter II
Krill as a Resource and its Place in the Ecosystem
General Antarctic Ecosystem
The Antarctic marine ecosystem may be defined both physically
and biologically. The biological parameters are limited by
the distribution of Euphasia species (krill) and some penguins,
fish, seals and phytoplankton. The physical boundary, charac-
terized by a steep temperature gradient (2-40 centigrade), is
the Polar Front or Antarctic Convergence which is dynamic and
found both north and south of 60° South. Antarctic Surface
Water moves northward until it sinks beneath the less-dense
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4Subantarctic Surface Water. (See: Figure L) The area to
the south of this convergence is much richer and more produc-
tive than the waters directly to the north. This is due mainly
to the marked increase in nutrient concentrations to the south. 1
Many organisms interact with the Antarctic marine ecosystem,
but are not limited to the southern side of the Convergence.
The most notable group here is, of course, whales.
The nutrient-rich waters of the Southern Ocean support a wealth
of life. Typical and generalized features of Antarctic organ-
isms are large body size, slow growth, and small number of
species. These characteristic features have evolved in re"
sponse to the severe environmental parameters. Marked season-
al changes and a short plant growing season are significant
factors in the survival of Antarctic species. The productive
season is estimated to be about 120 days per year. 2
The Antarctic ecosystem is by no means closed or limited to
the area south of the Antarctic Convergence. Carbon and nu-
trients are transported across the Convergence by whale, fish
and bird migrations. All ecological niches appear to be fill-
ed within the Southern Ocean. Green, in her 1977 report to
the Department of State, noted several special characteristics
1Sayed Z. EI-Sayed, "Biology of the Southern Ocean,"
Oceanus 18:(SummeF~1975), p. 41.
2I bi d., p, 41.
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of the Southern Ocean which are not shared by other marine
ecosystems. The extr~me seasonality in light and ice dic-
tate the short but very intense growing season. Pack ice
extends further north in the winter, thereby, covering and
uncovering krill. The edge of the ice cover seems to be an
area of intense ,biological activity. Behavioral mechanisms
of organsisms involved have adapted to these seasonal stress-
es so they may survive throughout the year. The Southern
Ocean may not be as productive as originally supposed, since
early observations were made during the summer. On a per
square meter per year basis, the Antarctic waters may not be
much more productive than other oceans. However, the short
food chains increase the amount of fixed Carbon which is trans-
ferred to the carnivores. No group of organisms is more than
three steps removed from phytoplankton in the food chain,
therefore, the Antarctic waters support an unusually dense
population of carnivores. The most significant aspect of the
ecosystem is the dependence of many predators on one prey
species (krill). This unusual dependence on one prey species
is possible because each predator consumes a different segment
of the krill population and the fact that krill occur in such
large quantities. Predators feed in different geographic lo-
cations, at different times of the year and on different size
classes of krill. 3
3Green, Katherine A., "Role of Krill in the Antarctic
Marine Ecosystem," (December 1977), p. c-14 in u.S. Department
of State, Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Possible
Re ime for Con ervation of Antarctic Livin Marine Resources,
June 1978): Appendix E.
6
Krill
Krill, the dominant herbivore, has its name derived from the
Norwegian translation for "whale food". Krill playa very im-
portant role since they are the main food item for many fish,
s~uid, penguins, seals and baleen whales. Most other Antarctic
species are only one step removed from krill in the food chain.
Krill have a relatively long life span, requiring several years
to reach maturity. They are classified as zooplankton or mi-
cronekton. Euphasia superba, Euphasia crystallorophias, and
Thysanoessa macura are the main krill species. 4 The predomi-
nant species and the only one of commercial interest is E.superba.
E. superba is rarely found north of the Convergence, but is a-
bundant to the south. Some krill, such asE;valentiniand ..
E. crystallorophias, do occur north of the convergence. 5
E. superba is a small (maximum length approximately 60 mm)
crustacean with an average weight of 1.4 grams. Growth acceler-
ates during spring and summer and slows during the rest of the
year. On the average, krill grow to 22~-ln length and 300 mg
in weight during their first year. By the end of their second
year, length averages 48mm and weight approximately 1 gram.
Age of sexual maturity and life span are not yet resolved. 6
4I bi d . , p. C-2.
5Sayed, p. 42.
6Several larval stages are passed through during growth.
E. superba transcends 12 different stages. Wilson, Richard B. ,
lOAn Evaluation of Possible United States Involvement in an Ant-
arctic.Krill Fishery," Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, (August 1976): p. 16.
?
Krill apparently do not breed until the beginning of their
third or fourth year and may breed for more than one season.?
These life span questions will affect the entimates of maximum
sustainable yield since the proportion of the population cap-
able of reproducing in one year cannot yet be determined.
Krill has a circumpolar distribution, but is by no means dis-
tributed symetrically throughout the Southern Ocean. Portions
of the ocean are heavily populated while other sectors are
barren. 8 (See: Figure II.). The Scotia and Weddell Seas are
regions of great abundance and the only known krill spawning
areas. Because these zooplanktxn are concentrated (for some
unknown reason) in swarms, large animals can catch enough to
feed themselves and man may feasibly harvest them. Swarms seem
to average 40 X 60 meters in size, but have been recorded as
large as 600 meters. They occur at varying depths down to a
depth of about 100 meters. 9 Dense enough to aiscolor the sea
water, they may be easily spotted from a ship or by satellite
remote sensing. 10 Other forms of zooplankton (i.e. copepods,
7Green, p. C-24.
8Major concentrations are found in the coastal East Wind
Drift, the Weddell Drift, the Bransfield Strait and to the east
of South Georgia Island. Wilson, p. 26.
9u. s. Department of State, Final Environmental Im~act State-
ment for a Possible Regime for Conservation of Antarct1c Living
Mar1ne Resources, (June 1978): p. 25.
_ 10sayed, p. 43. Color reported for the swarms are yellow,
ochre ,brown, brick and red. The vertical dimension of the
patches does not usually exceed 2 meters. Wilson, p. 17.
8
Principal concentrations of Antarctic krill.
Arrows indicate major water currents (From Marr, 1962).
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amphipods and chaetognaths) may be of equal or greater biomass
than krill, but seem to be utilized by predators to a much
lesser degree than krill. This may be due to the fact that
krill exhibit the swarming behavior, but may also be a mis-
interpretation due to lack of sufficient knowledge of the Ant-
arctic ecosystem. 11
Accurate estimates of krill biomass are not yet available,'
partially because of insufficient sampling techniques. Krill
are strong swimmers compared to most zooplankton, so normal zoo-
plankton collecting nets are not adequate. The high speed
trawls used in fishing for krill are the most appropriate
method of sampling. Unfortunately. these have not been used
over a wide enough area to provide feasible estimates. The
~warming behavior of krill makes extrapolation to the entire
ecosystem very difficult since their distribution is extremely
patchy. Because the krill estimates are based on speculation
rather than quantitative data, they are not reliable. Relia-
ble estimates may never be available. However, an estimated
standing stock range of 250 to 600 million tons and an annual
production rate (as opposed to the harvestable amount)of JOO
million tons are considered workable quantities since they are
compatible with Antarctic phytoplankton production rates. 12
Estimates of phytoplankton standing stock and production are
1lGreen. p. C-14.
12I bi d., p. C-15,16.
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derived from annual average production values for a small
region extrapolated to the whole Southern Ocean. The caveat
here is that conversion ratios and conversion factors are lit-
tIe more than intelligent guesses. Thi3 coupled with large
variations in the estimates of total Southern Ocean primary
production and the proportion of grazing attributed to krill
13results in a wide range of estimates. The biomass of other
Antarctic zooplankton is estimated to be the same as krill,
but reliable estimates of non-krill stocks are also lacking.
Total predation on krill by fish, squid, birds, seals and
whales is estimated at 330 million tons per year. 14 The amount
of krill taken by whales (even though they are not the major
consumers) plays a significant role in the question of krill
harvest. The argument that krill are in overabundance because
of the decline in the whale population ~nd may, therefore,
be harvested with relative impunity, is no longer considered
valid by scientists. In its simplest form, this scheme calls
for man to harvest whale's krill consumption in 1900 minus
whale"s krill consumption in the 1970's. Then, the argument
goes, food availability for other krill consumers will be at
least as good as it was in 1900 and the whales wilL be as well
off or better per capita than in 1900. Supposedly, this will
not cause a reduction in the whale population. On the other
IJEverson, Inigo, The Southern Ocean - the Living Resources
of the Southern Ocean, UNDP/FAO, Southern Oceans Fisheries Pro-
gram', Rome, GLO/SO/77/1 (September 1977) : p.123.
14Green, p. C-24.
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hand, their numbers may cease to increase. There are several
reasons that this is not reliable logic. First, man cannot
exactly replace the wnales as a predator. Second, the eco-
system may have already adjusted to the lowered whale popula-
tion. The available krill may have caused an increase in the
seal and penguin populations. Once a large commercial krill
harvest is in operation, it will displace some predators.
Some argue that population levels will return to what they were
when the whale levels were higher. This mayor may not be so·
It is possible that the ecosystem is in general equilibrium
with all stocks at their present levels. Population levels
for fish, squid, birds and seals during the era of whale abund-
ance are not known. 15 Fairly reliable estimates of the past
whale population do exist. A century ago the numbers of baleen
whales (blue, fin, sei, minke, humpback, and southern right
whales) totaled about one million with a biomass of about 43
million metric tons. Currently, the biomass is approximately
one seventh of the initial biomass. 16 Estimates of sustainable
krill harvest range from 70 to 150 million tons per year. A
harvest of 150 million tons would replace nearly one half of
the predators and have a drastic effect on the ecosystem.
Green suggests that a more plausible estimate should be 30 to
60 million tons per year with the larger value less likely to
be sustainable over a long period of time. It has also been
suggested that predators be harvested in proportion to krill
15Green, p. C-25.
16 Sayed, p. 24.
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harvested, but sustainable yields of seals, birds, fish and
squid cannot be determined due to lack of data. 17
Since the catastrophic decline of the baleen whale (those
with no teeth that must strain their food from the water)
population, (Sees Figure III~ krill seem to be the only liv-
ing marine resource of sizeable quantity which may be feasi-
bly harvested from Antarctic waters. It has been known for
many years that krill exist in large amounts. Only in the
mid 1960's, when the baleen whale stocks greatly declined
due to overharvesting, did interest in krill commercial ex-
ploi tation begin to rise. Fueling this interest .waa the
recent decline in North Atlantic Herring, Peruvian Anchovies,
Gulf of Mexico shrimp, and the defunct California sardine fish-
ery.18 Exploratory fishing for krill has been carried out by
the U.S.S.R., Japan, Chile, Federal Republic of Germany,
Poland, Norway, Taiwan, German Democratic Republic, Spain,
and Korea. 19 Reports of hourly catches have seen an upper
limit of 10 tons with conventional stern trawlers. The Soviets
suggest that one ton per hour is feasible. The Norwegians have
designed a system to process up to five tons per hour. During
eighty days of fishing, the Japanese recently harvested 1400
tons or about 3/4th tons per hour. 20
17Green, p. c-26.
18sayed, p. 47.
19U• S• Department of State., Final ErS, p. 35.
20Wilson, pp. 45-46.
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FIGURE I II.
Source: The Polar Times, (June 1977) p. 10.
Copyright 1977 by the American Polar Society
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Krill may be the largest (by volume and weight) marine living
resource to be left relatively unexploited by man. As a
source of income and protein, it has great potential. Table
I shows the high value of krill as a source of nutrition.
Note the high concentrations of protein and Vitamin A. The
protein capacity is comparable to beef steak, shrimp and lob·
ster.
A major difficulty encountered with respect to a successful
krill harvest is found with the rapid decomposition of the
body after death. Some sort of processing must occur immediate-
ly upon recovery. Freezing, the most common method, is not
adequately effective. Krill may be processed in different
ways. The Soviets initially processed krill into feed meal,
but this meal did not preserve well. They have now turned to
the production of a krill paste for human consumption. The
paste is marketed as an additive for cheese or butter, or may
be mixed with mayonnaise as a salad dressing or a stuffing.
Krill Protein Concentrate is another alternative. The con-
centrate is reported to contain close to 75% crude protein an~
may prove to be an excellent food additive. 21 The Japanese
have begun exploratory processing of krill into a liquid pro-
tein. The shells are first separated and saved for fish meal.
The end product has a protein level of 42%. The Japanese have
21Since krill have not been marketed as a food in the U.S.,
the attutudes and pOlicies of the Food and Drug Administration
should be considered. In the FDA requirements, special empha-
sis is given to a seafood's perishability and the need for rapid
application of preservative measures after harvesting. The
rapid rate of krill decomposition is cause for concern. The
quality of preservation should be a major factor in acquiring
government approvals for marketing. Wilson, p. 57.
15
Table~I~.~ : Chemical and Nutritive Properties of Krill.
43.8% saturated
32.8% monounsaturated
23.4% polyunsaturated
Dry Matter Biochemical Breakdown
Protein - 49%
Ash - 9.8%
Chitin - 2.5%
Lipid 24.6% =
Net Weight Vitamin and Carotenoid Content
- 380 I.U./lOOgrams
3.12 mg/lOOg
1.58 myg
1.1 mg7g
15 mg/g
70 myg
- 66 mg/lOOg
- 10 mg/lOOg
- 16 mg/lOOg
Vitamin A
Astaxanthin
Riboflavin
Vitamin B6
Ca-pantothenate -
Niacin
Folic acid
Biotin
Vitamin B12
Source: Wilson, Richard B., "An Evaluation of Possible U.S.
Involvement in an Antarctic Krill Fishery,' Thesis,
Massachusetts'Institute of Technology (August 1976):49,50.
19
also decided to market krill as krill. The krill resembles
popular coastal shrimp in Japan and is sold at about one sixth
the price. Krill, though, has a fish taste and smell which
may 'be too strong for the Japanese. 22 Specific products in-
clude: frozen cooked whole krill, dried krill, frozen attri-
tion-peeled tail meats and frozen minced muscle for fish meat
balls. In 1977, the Chileans test-marketed breaded krill sticks.
The success of this attempt is not yet known.
By-products such as oil and chitin are also of value. Marine
oils have always been in high demand. The best proof of this
is the demise of the whale population due to the quality of the
oil obtained from them. Chitin has diverse uses. Suggested
uses for chitin derivatives are: resins for chromotography,
metal recovery from waste water, paper strength additives and
textile dye binders. Chitin has also proven to have a variety
of medical uses. 23
Krill harvesting has few, if any, precendents in fishery man-
agement. Historically, species forming the upper levels of the
food chains have been harvested. Krill, though, may be termed
a "foundation species" because it forms a base for the Antarc-
tic food chain. Therefore, indirect impacts to organisms of
higher trophic levels as well as direct impacts on krill are
22I bi d., pp. 51, 53-54.
23Th e Soviets claim to have shown that krill paste is
useful in treating ulcers. This is supported by the fact
that chitin (found in the exoskeleton) exhibits wound heal-
ing properties. Ibid., p. 51.
17
of concern. Scientists can sometimes predict impacts of con-
ventional species, but are far less certain about repercussions
of a large commercial krill fishery.
Basic ecosystem management concerns include the recovery rates
of the baleen whale populations, impact on the abundance of
harvestable fish and squid, and impact on penguin and seal pop-
ulations. The central position of krill within the Antarctic
food chain indica~es the importance of understanding the eco-
system interrelationships and dictates that there be some sort
of rational management scheme. It should be stressed that
existing data is lean. Limits on commercial harvesting will
help protect the ecosystem from irreversible harm and also
provide some of the data needed. Monitoring of dependent pop-
ulations will help in prediction of the impact on the ecosystem
as a whole. 24 Rational management of this resource is esse~
ual on both environmental and economic grounds. It will be
best to negotiate a management regime while the fishery is in
its infancy, thereby, avoiding economic confrontation of great
magnitude. Catch statistics from participating countries would
make predictions more accurate, but several countries have
indicated that such information will be made available to a
conservation organization and not before. For an ecosystem
(versus a single species) approach to management, Everson sug-
gests the following problems must first be answeredl
1) Estimation of production at different trophic levels.
2) Effects of changes in predatoron prey stocks or visa versa.
24Green, p. C-28.
18
3) Indirect effects of harvest by man. 25
Krill are distributed throughout the Southern Ocean. Though
estimates of krill biomass and numbers vary, it is agreed that
they are very abundant. The swarming behavior of the resource
along with advances in fishing technology and development of
markets make commercial exploitation feasible. Krill may
be an excellent source of protein and income, therefore, the
danger exists that stock depletion may go beyond the level
healthy for the ecosystem. The Antarctic ecosystem as a
whole is heavily dependent upon the niche filled by krill.
With this in mind, a management scheme is seen as necessary.
Problems exist with respect to the development of a rational
management plan due to lack of scientific data on krill and
also because of the unique nature of international Antarctic
history and politics.
25Everson, p. 123.
Chapter III
Legal StatusoftheAnt~ic - Background and Present Treaty
The present governing international instrument for the Antarctic
continent is the Treaty of December 1, 1959. This Treaty supports
control of the continent in the hands of thirteen Consultative
states: Argentina, Australia, Belguim, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland (given Consultative status in 1977),
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Six other states have acceded to the Treaty, but do not
have Consultative status. These include: Czechoslovakia (1962),
Denmark (1965), Netherlands (1967), Romania (1971), German Demo-
cratic Republic (1974), and Brazil (1975). This group of 19 na-
tions is known as the Antarctic Treaty Group (ATG). The Federal
Republic of Germany and Uruguay have expressed interest in acced-
ing to the Treaty.
History Of International Activity
Explorers have been sailing the Antarctic seas since the fifteenth
century. Edmund Haley (discoverer of Haley's comet) led the
first scientific expedition to the area in 1700. His mission,
under British Admiralty, was to calIon as many islands as pos-
~ble and measure magnetic declination. He was stopped by ice,
so never touched upon the mainland. Early explorers of the
Southern Ocean include Captain James Cook who made several voy-
ages with Sir Joseph Banks1 (1768-71), and with William Wales and
1An eminent natural historian.
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Willaim Bayly2 (1772-75). Other noted explorers include:
Russian Admiral Thaddeus Belingshausen (1819-21), English
sealers George Powell (1821) and James Weddell (1823), and
Naturalist James Eights of Albany who sailed with American
Captains Palmer and Pendleton (1829).3
As far as records reveal, the first landing on the mainland
was by United states sealing Captain John Davis on 7 February
1821. The first scientific expedition to 'winter over' was
headed by· Belgian Lieutenant Adrien de Gerlache. His party
earned this distiction by being 'frozen in' from 1897-99. The
first deliberate 'over winter' expeditions were led by Sweden's
Otto Nordenskjold and Britain's Robert F. Scott from 1901-04.
Attempts to penetrate the interior began with an abortive attempt
to reach the South pole by English Lieutenant Ernest Shackleton
between 1907-09. The most tragic figure in the Antarctic history
is British Captain Scott who wanted more than anything to be
the "discoverer" of the South Pole. He returned to the Antarctic
in 1910 and reached the pole on 17 January 1912, only to perish
with his entire expedition on the return trek. All of his effort
brought him in second, since the Norwegian party of Roald
Amundsen arrived at the pole on 14 December 1977 and returned
safely. 4
2Astronomers from the Greenwich Observatory.
3Deacon, Sir George, "Southern Ocean Exploration," Oceanus
18 (Summer 1975): p. 2.
4Hayton, Robert D., "The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,"
American Journal of International Law 54 (1960): p. 350.
21
Most of the Consultative Parties have some history of Antarctic
involvement. England initiated a series of "Discovery Expedi-
tions" in 1925. United States interest in the Antarctic dates
from the early part of the 19th century with the 1838-42 ex-
pedition of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. American interest took
another upswing in 1928 with the beginning of the Byrd Expedi-
tions and the work of Sir Hubert Wilkins. The Japanese, during
the season of 1911-12, carried out their only expedd t i on prior
to the International Geophysical Year (IGY). German aerial map-
ping efforts in 1938-39 were led by Captain Alfred Ritscher.
From 1939-42, the United States operated an Antarctic Service
on a major scale which was abandoned because of World War II.
After the war (1946-47), the United States Navy organized the
largest pre-IGY United States expedition. 5 Argentina held annual
relief voyages to a meteorological station in the South Orkneys
beginning in 1904, but their first expedition was in 1942. Britain
began her Falkland Islands Dependencies Surveys in 1943. The
Chileans entered the picture in 1947 with their first expedition.
The French first discovered the Adelie Coast by a 1837-40 voy-
age by Captain D'Urville, but did not revisit this area until
1950. 1911-14 saw the "Australasian Antarctic Expedition."
New Zealand had been used as a point of departure for the British,
but came into the picture on their own with the British-Australian-
5U. S• Department of St;:.te Announcement, "Twelve Nations Sign
Treaty Guaranteeing Nonmilitarization of Antarctica and Freedom
of Scientific Investigarion," in U. S. Congress, House, Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Miscellaneous
Part 1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment on H.R. 4, 95th Cong., 1st
session, 1977: p. 32 •
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New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition of 1929-31. Between
1908 and 1946, seven of the Consultative Powers (Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom)
laid claim to pie slice sections of the Antarctic. The claims
of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom overlap. (See: Figure IV.)
The United States, Soviet Union, Belgium, South Africa and Japan
have refrained from making any claims or recognizing existing
claims. The United States is the only nation consciously active
during this pre-International Geophysical Year (1957-58) period
which has made no national claim to a portion of the Antarctic
continent.
Among the claimant states, the potential for conflict, especially
between Britain, Argentina and Chile was on rapid rise. Realiz-
ing the intensity of the situation, the United States Department
of State in 1948 approached the seven nations concerned with a
conference proposal aimed at internationalization. The seven
were so adamant about not dropping their claims that the idea
was shelved. Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union wisely demanded
full participation in any Antarctic settlement. The matter drift-
ed for several years until proposed for discussion at the United
Nations in 1956 by India. 7 The Indian representative proposed
inclusion of the Antarctic question on the provisional agenda
of the United Nations General Assembly. He hoped for an agree-
ment of all nations that the area be used for the welfare of the
6Hayton, p. 351.
7I bi d . , p. 352.
23
MAP3 NATIONAL CLAIMS TO ANTARCTICA
ANTARCTICA
r·
NEW ZEALAND
~ Coastline
... _ ...... Front of ice shelf
o
I
o
,
lIOO
590 10POMil81
i
IOOOKllo ...t.r. AuSt'r'~Jio
Source: Alexander, Regional Arrangements in Ocean Affairs, (May
1977): p. 35.
24
whole world. Prior to the twelve nation Antarctic Treaty
'~ Conference, India urged.that the United Nations should have a
chance to comment and offer suggestions on participation by non-
signatory governments in whatever regime provided. 8 The negative
reactions from states active in the Antarctic was successful
in stifling these attempts at outside control.
During the mid 1950's, attention was also turned to the poten-
tial for Antarctic contribution to scientific research. The uni-
queness of this virgin territory along with its resource poten-·
tial stimulated the initiation of much scientific inquiry. The
International Geophysical Year (IGY), was an eighteen month pro-
gram dating from 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958 and was design-
ed to promote international scientific cooperation. The· IGY
brought to light the fact that the 'cold war' could be extended
to the Antarctic. Though activities during this period were to
be non-political, nations became visibly apprehensive about
the sector claims. Pressure was on governments to take steps
to insure national rights in the area and at the same time up-
hold the freedom of scientific inquiry. Nearly all IGY par-
ticipants in the Antarctic agreed to a one year extention of
scientific cooperation. The United states Department of state
in 1958, once again realizing the future implications of the sit-
uation, undertook an extensive study of the Antarctic problem. 9
8International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN), "Notes on the Proposed Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine living Resources (Draft),"
(27 June 1978): p. 13.
9Hayton, p. 353.
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Antarctic Treaty
In the spring of 1958, President Eisenhower announced that the
United States had invited eleven other nations (Argentina. Aus-
tralia. Belgium. Chile. France, Japan. New Zealand. Norway.
Union of South Africa. the Soviet Union and United Kingdom) to
a conference in Washington. For various reasons the conference
did not begin until ten months after official termination of
the IGY. The conference was organized into two working groups:
Committee I to deal with scientific matters and Committee II to
deal with legal and political matters. 10 The final document of
fourteen articles was signed at Washington on 1 December 1959
and entered into force on 23 June 1961. (See: Annex I.)
The Antarctic Treaty is oriented toward peaceful continuance of
scientific cooperation (Articles I and II). Article III
promotes international cooperation in scientific investigations.
Scientific observations. results and personnel are to be freely
exchanged. This has not been the case with exploration of
krill resources. Nations have been reluctant to share catch
data. Krill. though. may not fall within the purview of the
Antarctic Treaty. This point will be clarified later in the
study.
The Treaty provides for the arrest of the claims issue (Article
IV). This was an essential ingredient for acceptance of the
10 I bi d .• p. 358.
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Treaty by the twelve original Consultative powers. Article IV
is of special interest because of the way it shoves the issue
of territorial claims into what must be a temporary purgatory.
Despite the apparent freeze of the claims issue, the realization
that this jurisdictional split must someday be reconcilled has
had important influence over cooperative habits among the Antarc-
tic Treaty Parties. Claimants and non-claimants are not much
nearer agreement today than they were in 1959. In fact the divi-
sion may have widened. The United States continues to maintain
its policy of non-recognition of claims. Some nations (i.e.
Chile and Argentina) have become even more adamant in their
stances. Before signing the 1959 Treaty, both of these states
proclaimed 200 mile zones of national jurisdiction off of their
respective claims. No other claimants have followed this example.
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty may be interpreted as pro-
hibiting, subsequent to signing, the establishment of such zones. 11
Article V prohibits nuclear explosions and disposal of radio- .
active wastes. Article VI outlines the physical boundary of
--"
the Antarctic Treaty area as "the area south of 60 0 South Lati-
tude, including all ice shelves." Nothing in the Treaty is to
"affect the rights ••. of any state under international law with
regard to the high seas within that are~," but the Treaty fails
to define how much of the sea south of 60 0 South is not high seas.
Article VII provides for the right of inspection of foreign
11 IUCN, p. 8.
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stations, installations and equipment. Aerial observation may
be undertaken at any time over any area of the Antarctic. This
is a first between the United States and Soviet Union. Apparently,
the inspection system is to insure against unauthorized military
activity. Article VIII maintains jurisdiction of a state over
its nationals anywhere on the Antarctic continent.
The Treaty also provides for states to keep abreast of the
international Antarctic situation by holding periodic consul-
tative meetings. (Article IX) These meetings provide an arena
for consideration of issues of common interest to Consultative
Parties. It is relatively easy for a dissatisfied nation to
disassociate itself from the Treaty. Any party state may with-
draw from the Treaty if its government fails to ratify an
amendment which was unanimously approved by the cont~acting
parties. So far, no state has withdrawn.
Article X maintains that no contracting party engage in any
activity contrary to the principles or pur~~ses of the Treaty.
Article XI provides for dispute settlement. Disputes may be
referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) , but there
is no compulsory jurisdiction by the ICJ. Article XII provides
for Treaty amendment by unanimous agreement on the contracting
parties. Thirty years from the date the Treaty entered into
force, any of the party nations may call a review conference.
(23 June 1991) A different decision-making procedure for amend-
ments will apply at this meeting. If review conference
r----------------------------~--- -
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is called and amendments are agreed to by a majority of the
parties, a state not ratifying the changes within two years
is free to withdraw. 12 It is open to question whether the .
Antarctic Treaty will effectively survive until 1991. Most
states seem to regard the Treaty as temporary and of no more
than thirty year duration.
Article XIII provides for accession to the treaty by any member
of the United Nations. States members by accession, which have
not qualified for representation in the Consultative meetings
are not represented at any stage. This restriction may make
otherwise interested states reluctant to join; however, this pro-
tects directly interested states with Consultative status from
inactive states which may hold up amendments. Article XIV
maintains that the Treaty (done in English, French, Russian
and Spanish) shall be deposited in the archives of the United
States government.
Antarctic Claims
Briefly, the various claims are based on the following national
experiences. Britain finds ground for a claim in the voyage
of Captain Cook in 1773. Captain Cook was the first "official"
explorer sent by Britain, but British claims were not formalized
until 1908. The original claims covered two-thirds of the Ant-
arctic continent. Much of this was later ceded to New Zealand
12Zumberge, James H., "Mineral Resources and Geopolitics
i::1 Antarctica," American Scientist 67 (January-February 1979):
p 75·
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and Australia. The 1923 cession of a mostly unexplored sector
constitutes the origin of New Zealand's claim. Until 1957-
58, when they established an Antarctic base, New Zealand took
little interest in Antarctic territory. The 1926 cession of
approximately one third of the Antarctic brought Australia into
the claims arena. The first Australian station was not establish-
ed until 1954. Chile delineated its claim in 1950. Frior to
this time Chile has no substantial record of Antarctic activity,
but considers the territory as a natural extention of its south-
ernmost province. Some Norwegian exploration and whaling preceded
its 1939 claim. The one Norwegian station maintained from 1958-
60 was abandoned and no year-round station has been established
since. France holds that an alleged sighting of the Antarctic
coast in 1840 provides them with the right to control a portion
of its mainland. The claim was not made until 1924 and not de-
lineated until 1938. The first French base was established in
1957. Argentina issued its claim in 19~5 after short ~maint enanc e
of a meteorological station on an island 400 miles removed from
the Antarctic mainland. 13
The methods of acquiring territory under international law re-
main unsettled, but five modes are of note here. 1) Contiguity
is the 'natural' extention of the geographic boundaries of a land
mass due to proximity. This argument is used by Chile, Argentina,
New '~aland and Australia. Some pUblicists maintain that this
is a dangerous theory since it may cause other Southern Hemi-
13Anonymous, "Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica
Under the Law of Common Spaces," The Yale Law Journal 87 (March
1978 ) ~ p. 811.
30
sphere states to lay claims, thus leading to more international
disruption. 14 South Africa (a non-claimant) has already de-
fended this principle. 2) Discovery is historically the most
important method of acquiring territory. After the 18th cen-
tury, discovery had to be followed by effective occupation.
The assertion of 'discovery is used for Antarctic claims
by Australia, Britain, France and Norway. The major challenge
to this theory's applicability to Antarctic territory is based
on the fact that there have been ·num. er ou s explorers of diff-
erent nationalities. 3) Effective Occupation is defined as
the settlement of a territory belonging to no other state
(terra nullius). Such a settlement must be made within a rea-
sonable time after discovery and assume a permanent character. 15
Effective occupation "perfects" the claim, but its meaning re-
mains unclear. How long must the settlemBnt be maintained? What
must be accomplished? How much control is needed over unoccupied
land? The Presidents and Cabinets of both Chile and Argentina
have made official visits to their respective sectors to help
reinforce their claims. Documentation of births and marriages
on Antarctic territory has also been filed.
Is this going to aid their position or is it empty formality?
Some writers argue that the mobility of Antarctic scientists
makes effective occupation of the southernmost continent 'inter-
national' in nature. It should also be noted that the population
of many Antarctic stations is seasonal and/or temporary. 4) Minimal
14I bi d., p , 816.
15Von Glahn, Gerhard, Law Arnone: Nations - An Introd.uction
to Public International Law, (Macmillian Publishing Co.• Inc.
1976): p. 274.
31
Cont r ol is a contigency theory advanced by claimamt states in the
event they cannot convince the international community of the
effective control argument. According to this idea, less control
is required to sustain a claim in an uninhabited or sparsely
inhabited region. The concept has been upheld in past cases of
the ICJ, but the majority of examples pertained to tiny islands
with little importance and none were subject to a multinational
treaty.16 5) The Sector theory was derived from Arctic claims of
the Soviet Union and Canada. According to Van Glahn, it is doubt-
ful that the theory represents a rule of international law. 17
Actually, it is not a theory but a manner of delimiting claims
based on other theories. In any event, it is undermined by the
distance between the Antarctic and the claimants. Application of
this theory has brought about incongruous results, leaving parts
of the Antarcxic unclaimed and parts claimed by three states.
:vhether or not these claims are based on proper international
legal doctrine is beside the fact that they are ill-advised from
the point-of-view of international social, economical and politi-
cal interaction. The world is in the midst of dymanic shifts in
political and economical realities as witnessed by the rise of
Arab nations and the New International Economic Order. Inter-
dependence of states is on the rise as never before and there is
a worldwide interest in control of new lands and resources as seen
16Anonymous, pp.82C,822. An exception is the Eastern Greenland
arbitration between Norway and Denmark. Demnark won the decision
by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The basis of
the ruling was that claims to sovereignty over thinly populated
teni~o~ies requires lesser showing of control. See: F. C.I.J.,
1933, Sere AlB, No. 53.
17 Von Glahn, p. 284.
)2
in regard to deep-seabed resources. Hopefully, there is also a
mutual concern for the world environment. Antarctic claims by
single states have their validity undermined by historical
evidence (i.e. the amount of international activity within the
Southern Ocean and on the mainland) One publicist argues that
they violate the historical pattern of international practice
and agreement in the Antarctic and rest on inadequate
application of various doctrines of international law. 18
No state other than the fellow claimants have recogr.ized any
Antarctic territorial claims. The United Nations has taken
no position on the issue of Antarctic sovereignty. Initiative
for such non-action may be founded in the realization that any
United Nations position may throw the whole Antarctic question
under the purview of the United Na t i on s Conference on the law
of the Sea (UNClOS). This issue will be dealt with- in more
detail later in this study. Questions as to whether the inter-
national principles of development of sovereignty apply t o the
Antarctic are a major focus in the establishment of any sort
of resource management regime for the area~
The Antarctic Treaty is not the sole source of international
law for the Antarctic, though it is the most widely accepted
statement of principles applicable to the area. 2ven so, the
extent to which the Treaty supports various positions concerning
jurisdiction and resource management is open to debate. The Treaty
neither recognizes nor fails to recognize claims of exclusive
18k~onymous, p. 8e7.
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rights; therefore, controversy over the issue of jurisdiction
remains. It is not the purpose of this paper to establish all
of the international legal pros and cons of the claims issue.
It should be understood, though, that the issue of jurisdiction
is a major point of contention which may have to be resolved
in order to provide for an effective and peaceful solution to
international management of Antarctic resources. It may be
feasi bLe, to secure a management regim.e for krill and other Li.v-
ing marine resources and at the same time skirt the juris-
dictional problem. This is due partially to the fact that, even
with the claims issue ·unresolved on the mainland, the Southern
Ocean may be accepted by the claimants to be high seas.
Chapter IV
1959 Antarctic Treaty
Resource Management and Environmental Protection
The Antarctic Treaty does not treat the subject of com-
mercial exploration and exploitation. It merely pro-
vides for the discussion of future measures to conserve
and preserve Antarctic living resources. (See: Article IX.)
In 1959 the resource question was less crucial and easily
avoided. Today the potential for confrontation over this
issue is considerable and the krill harvest issue is
contributing to a breakdown of the present Antarctic power
structure. There is a difference of opinion as to who
should have a say in the management of Antarctic marine
living resources. Claimant states may feel they control
the resources in "their" sectors. Non-claimant states,
on the other hand, are pressing for freedom of access to
the continent and surrounding waters as a whole. The
Treaty has, in spite of this basic point of contention,
provided some mechanism of resource management and environ-
mental protection. A brief overview is in-order.
Agreed Measures
With respect to the considerations in Article IX, resource
management and environmental protection have always played
an important role in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.
The present 'rules' regarding the Antarctic ecosystem are
to be found in the Agreed Measures for Conservation of
34
35
Antarctic Flora and Fauna which were recommended at the 3rd
Consultative Meeting. (Brussels - 1964.) (See: Annex 11.)1
The important considerations provided for in the Agreed
Measures include:
1. Overall protection of all native mammals other
than whales and birds.
2. Special protection of rare or vulnerable species.
3. Minimization of inadvertent harm to wildlife by
man's activities.
4. A ban on the import of non-indigenous species
except by permit.
Neither krill nor fish will be specifically protected by
the Agreed Measures. The area of applicability includes
only the continent and the pack ice. The measures have not
yet been unanimously approved by the governments of the
Consultative Parties. The United States recently passed
the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Pl95-541) for the
purpose of approving the Agreed Measures. Australia is
going through the ratification process. Domestic legal
problems in Japan have delayed the ratif~~ation process.
There are apparent Constitutional difficulties in Japanese
enforcement of provisions on persons other than its civil
servants. The Agreed Measures have proved effective on
a voluntary basis, but will become legally binding as
soon as all party governments ratify them. How will the
Agreed Measures influence the krill harvest or conservation
regime? The major impact the Agreed Measures would have
lThese measures arose out of SCAR initiative and are of
an interim nature, pending ratification by all Treaty Powers.
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upon krill management concerns the possibility of land-based
processing stations, and inadvertent harm to wildlife by
the fishing activity.
8th Consultative Meeting
At the 8th Consultative Meeting (June 1975, Oslo), the
contracting parties resolved to try to find a solution to
the problem of possible commercial activity. At that time,
Norway proposed that Treaty Parties consider the conservation
issue. The United States offered to host an international
scientific conference on living resources of the Southern Ocean
to review existing knowledge and to propose future studies.
This conference was held in August of 1976 at ~oods Hole,
Massachusetts with an attendance of 59 scientists from
14 countries. 2 Working within the Scientific Committee
on Antarctic Research (SCAR), a program labelled Biological
Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks (BIOMASS)
was developed to help lay a basis for understanding the
Antarctic ecosystem and provide s c i errtLf'LciLnt'o rrnat.i on
needed for later decisions on a conservation regime.
Elaboration on the BIOMASS Program may be found in the SCAR
Section of this study.
9th Consultative Meetin~
Living resources became the priority issue on the Antarctic
2U. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 66.
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Treaty Consultative agenda in 1977. At the 9th Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting (London), it was decided that
a definitive conservation regime should be established by
the end of 1978. (See: Annex III.) The regime was to
be based on an ecosystem approach that would not be
limited only to commercially exploitable species and
would extend north of the Antarctic Treaty area (south of
60 0 South) where "necessary for the effective conservation
of species of the Antarctic ecosystem without prejudice to
coastal state jurisdiction in that area." Article IV
principles of the Antarctic Treaty are to be guaranteed. J
Some nations felt that the IJ Party states should take into
their own hands the management responsibilities for
Antarctic marine living resources. The United States and
most others felt otherwise. 4 A few interim measures were
agreed upon. Parties were to:
1. Cooperate in the exchange of data relating to
living marine resources.
2. Demonstrate the greatest possible concern in
harvesting to avoid depletion of the stocks or
jeopardizing the Antarctic marin~_ ecosystem as
a whole. -
J. Urge states not party to the Treaty to respect the
guidelines if actively fishing.
3IUCN, p. 11.
- 4Brewster, Robert C.: Deputy assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs, Remarks in U. S. Congress, House, Committee
in Merchant Marine and Fisheries, ?isheries Miscellaneous.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment on Antarctic Fisheries
Agreement, 95th Cong., 1st sessa (1977): p. 275.
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The issue of membership in the regime is left in an ambiguous
state in the Recommendations of the 9th Meeting. Should
Recommendations IX-2(III)3a and IX-2(III)3b be interpreted
as advising against non-party involvement? (See: Annex III.)
Recommendation IX-2(III)J notes that "the Lne~7 regime should
explicitly recognize the prime responsibilities of the
Consultative Parties ...• " In Recommendation IX-2(III)3b
they state that "the provisions of Article 4 of the Antarctic
Treaty shall not be affected by the regime." Recommendation
IX-2 calls for a Special Consultative Meeting to negotiate
a draft regime.
Special Consultative Meeting - Canberra
From 27 February to 16 March, 1978, the first Special
Consultative Meeting was held in Canberra, Australia.
Eight negotiating texts were tabled by various delegations
at the beginning of the meeting. Tentative concurrence
was reached on the question of membership since it was
---
agreed that the regime should take the form of an international
convention open to all states. The Canberra Meeting formally
recognized the need for a conservation regime because of:
(1 )
(2 )
( J )
(4 )
the great living resource potential of the Antarctic;
the fact that commercial harvesting has already
begun;
realization of the consequences of an uncontrolled
harvest;
the perception of major gaps in scientific data. S
SBrewster, Remarks in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Commerce, Science and~ransporlation, P~tarctic Living
Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the National
Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. 2, J.
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Two issues important to rational management were not
discussed. Interim conservation standards or measures and
the provisional application of the new convention escaped
i d t' 6cons~ era ~on.
The claimant states may be attempting to enha~ce their
Antarctic claims through the resource regime. Their argu-
ment was based on the fact that the Antarctic Treaty itself
does not deal with the resource issue; therefore, a failure
of the new regime to preserve their right to control fishery
zones would be equivalent to denial of the existence of
the territorial claims. 7 Unfortunately, such reactions show
a tendency toward weighing political considerations more
heavily than environmental considerations. A regime based
on political interests will be mucn less likely to be an
effective conservation instrument as it will be a statement
of international political-commercial matters.
The Canberra draft opens the convention to all states engaged
in research or harvesting within the convention area. 8 Some
of the Antarctic Treaty Group had argued for special rights
for Treaty members, but this was not included in the draft.
The production of a basis for further negotiation, though,
was an important step forward. The major accomplishment
6Barnes, Memo - Special Consultative Meeting, Canberra,
p. 8.
7I bi d., P. 17.
8South Korea and Taiwan may be prevented from entering
because of political problems. Both are presently willing
to participate. Ibid., p. 18.
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of the Canberra meeting was the preparation of a single
unified negotiating text. 9
Special Consultative Meeting - Buenos Aires
The last Special Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic
Treaty Powers was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina from
17 to 28 JUly, 1978. The most critical issues at this
meeting related to territorial claims, voting requirements
and the basic ecosystem standard. Discussion of interim
conservation measures was blocked by one of the dele-
gations, and once again no agreement was reached on the
claims issue. Though such procedural problems were
encountered, it is rumored that the Buenos Aires text is
stronger in several aspects from a conservation viewpoint
than was the Canberra draft. l O
As far as the juridical question is concerned, the Canberra
and Buenos Aires drafts were essentially identical and
unacceptable to several claimant and non~claimant states.
The language of the draft apparently left the juridical
question in a condition of much flexibility. Several
solutions were advanced and found unwelcome. Confusion seemed
to be the only outsome, so the United States offered to
9 I bi d . , p. 18.
lOBarnes, Jim, Memorandum concerning - Special
Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty Fowers,
Buenos Aires, Argentina (17-28 July 1978) and Informal
Meeting in Washington D. C. (18-26 September 1978) to
Negotiate a Marine Living Resources Regime, for Center For
law and Social Policy (20 November 1978): p. 3, 9.
41
host an informal working group in washington. l l
Informal Meeting
The Washington meeting was opened on 18 September. 1978 for
the explicit purpose of continuing work on the juridical
and decision-making articles. The outcome of this meeting
was an attempt to protect both claimant and non-claimant
positions. It is reported that Parties on either side
of the issue may interpret the provisions as supporting
their beliefs. It is believed this approach will work if
the claimants restrain from trying to enforce or exercise
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
12Zone rights of a coastal state. This is a tenuous stability
and may not provide for a successful conservation regime.
The claims issue is especially important in light of the
fact that the Buenos Aires has allowed for membership in
the regime to be open to any state participating in the
meeting which finally produces an acceptable text. Whether
or not they engage in harvesting or scientific research
in the Antarctic is not the crucial factor, unless they are
absent from this decisive meeting. If absent, they may accede
to the Treaty if engaged in research of harvesting of
Antarctic marine living resources. These are the only
llIbid., p. 15.
l2 I bi d., p. 17.
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standards presently provided to evaluate a potential member. l J
Some states have favored the creation of an exclusive
Antarctic conservation club limited in membership to nations
presently involved. The legal right of the Antarctic
Treaty Parties to monopolize discussion of the resource
issue is questionable. First, no duties or obligations
arising from the Treaty Consultations can be imposed on
non-treaty states. Second, the Treaty does not confer
any ownership to the Antarctic. It may be beyond the legal
limits of the Treaty parties to exclude the international
community from resource benefit. ~hird, the Treaty is
especially weak concerning the areas where the important
resources are to be found--the Southern Ocean and the
Continental Shelf. It could also be argued that there is
no precedent for ascribing jurisdiction in waters surrounding
°d f to 1 ° 14an area V01 0 any na 10na sovere1gnty.
Since 1973, the Treaty ~owers have discussed living and
-"
mineral resources in secret sessions. Reports and deliber-
ations of Consultative meetings have always been held in
secret because the original signatories to the Treaty chose
not to establish an open organization. 1 5 The present air
of secrecy may be partially due to concern over Third World
interference in the negotiations. There is a safeguard
13 I b i d., p. 2J.
14IUCN, p. 12.
15Barnes, James N., Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science and~ransportation, Antarctic
livin Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the
National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. JO.
43
against policy-making by a single state in the fact that all
recommendations must be unanimous. 16 The Treaty Parties,
though, have affirmed the interest of the world community
in the protection of Antarctic resources. (See: Annex III. )
Since 1959 they have enacted a variety of protective
measures for the environment and encouraged non-treaty state
participation in enforcement. In spite of this apparent
concern, no consultative party has proposed inviting other
organizations or states to attend the meetings. l? Only
two categories of states may share in the policy-making--
the original 12 and any subsequent interested states willing
to accede to the Treaty. For a nation to gain Consultative
status, interest must be proved by "conducting substantial
scientific research activity." (See: Article IX (2).) The
Article IX provision of the Antarctic Treaty fails to define
"substantial." This has led to an incongruent mix of
states within and without the decision-making arena. The
status of any of the original 12 cannot be changed unless
they are willing to withdraw. An acceding state, though,
may loose status if its interest falls short. Several
original party states show little scientific invol~ent;18
while several states with scientific interest do not have
Consultative status. 19 Therefore, the Antarctic Treaty is
l60f course, there is the possibility of a single Consulta-
tive state veto and, therefore, blockage of policy by that lone state.
l?Anonymous, p. 842.
18Belgium has no station. Norway has two seasonal
stattons with no more than 14 persons on site. _ South Africa,
New(~ealand and France have only one station a piece.
\- ~
19Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and West Germany.
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breaking down in its attempt to represent this southernmost
continent with interested nations. It is suggested that
this may be because the Treaty mechanism was established
before the commercial and environmental concerns were on
th . 20e upsw~ng. An interesting question is whether it
would be acceptable for a group of less developed countries
to join together and collectively commit resources to
Antarctic research, thereby entitling them to Consultative
status. The experience of the Group of 77 on the LOS
negotiations indicates that this may be a feasible political
and economical alternative. If the Antarctic Treaty effec-
tively survives, the Antarctic issue remains separate
from the UNCLOS negotiations, and the Third World states
are essentially unrepresented in the upcoming living
resource management regime, such a pact may be of worth in
order to assert Third World interests.
The response of the Treaty powers to most outside initia-
tives has been negative. Though they have not established
any sort of sovereignty (joint or otherwlse) in Antarctic,
they demonstrate a dominion position. Two possible reasons
for this are suggested. First, to protect the balance struck
between claimants and non-claimants, and secondly, out of
resistance to share the benefits of eventual resource
1 't t' 21exp o~ a ~on.
20Anonymous, p. 835.
21 IUCN, p. 14.
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The Antarctic Treaty Group was partially responsible for the
withdrawal of a proposed $45 million FAO/UNDP program and
have blocked considerations by UNEP concerning the Treaty
area. 22 The proposed UNEP program sought to give special
attention to protection of the environment, especially to
the possibility of exploitation of resources. The plan
was to have the Treaty Powers and "other concerned govern-
ments" establish a body to formultte guidelines for explor-
ation and exploitation. Members of the ATG in attendance
at UNEP's Governing Council blocked any consideration of
this matter. 23
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty appears to affirm the interest of
all states. Questionable is the appropriateness of its
structure for the protection of living marine resources
and implementation of the rights of non-party states. The
extent to which the Treaty applies off shore is debatable.
Should the legal status of the continent apply to the seas
south of 60 0 South latitude? Article VI delimits the
-
Treaty area as south of 60 0 South but high seas within
this area are excluded. As of yet, agreement on the status
of the waters within the Treaty area has not been reached.
The Antarctic Treaty System has been instrumental in outlinin~
resource management stipulations for terrestrial organisms
22I bi d., p. 14j Wilson, Gregory, P. "Antarctica, The South-
ern Ocean and the Law of the Sea." (Thesis prepared for Professor
louis B. Sohn, Harvard Law School 1976): p. 24.
23Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, USSR, UK. and the
US are members of the Governing Council. Belgium and Norway are
not members but were represented. Wilson, G., p. 25.
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(Agreed Mea sur es ) and in initiating research activity for the
purpose of better understanding the Antarctic Ecosystem (BIOMASS).
The incipient stage of agreement on a conservation regime
for Antarctic marine living resources was the 9th Con-
cultative Meeting (1977). There was concensus among the
parties that the "ecosystem approach" be utilized and that
the new regime should cover the area of competence of the
Antarctic Treaty and extend north of 60 0 South latitude
where necessary for effective conservation. The 1959
Antarctic Treaty though, does not represent the Antarctic
with all interested states. If krill exploitation grows
without a settlement, it may pose no great problem if
limited to the Antarctic Treaty Parties. The Treaty at
least provides for exchange of scientific information,
environmental controls, and a weak form of dispute settle-
ment. However, states not bound by the Treaty have already
expressed an interest in the krill resource. Wi t hout a
separate internationalcgreement, these states may possibly
become environmentally and politically disruptive. Inter-
national activity within the Antarctic region involving ATG and
non-ATG states is becoming more common.
Chapter V
International Practice
Fishing
As noted, expeditions devoted mainly to development in the
field of fisheries (as opposed to whaling, sealing or science)
have begun relatively recently. Interest in the krill fishery
has greatly accelerated. In addition to the potential of
krill as a protein source, the establishment of 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) has forced distant-water
fishing nations to find new marine fisheries. 1 Fishing in-
dustries such as fish-meal and oil are only feasible when
catch rates are very high; therefore, the lowered catch rates
in traditional fishing areas is an additional stimulus.
These developments taken together with improvements in krill
harvest methods and the decline of Southern Hemisphere
whaling, combine to motivate fishing states to begin exploita-
tion of this Antarctic crustacean.
The Soviets were among the first to fish krill, catching
1For example, it is estimated that the USSR may be de-
prived of six million tons of fish when 200-mile EEZ's come
into force world wide. Earthscan Press Briefing Document No.
5, "The Future of Antarctica,"
The United Kingdom Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers
Associations is pressing the government to lay claim to vast
areas of the South Atlantic by drawing 200-mile zones around
a number of 'British' islands. Barbara Mitchell, "Antarctic
Riches - For Whom?," Forum (August 1976), both in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploita-
tion of Antarctic Resources. Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, 95th
Cong., 2nd sess., (1978): pp. 76,218.
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four tons with the vessel MUKSUN in 1961-62. They have
operated in the Southern Ocean in most years since, repor-
tedly taking tens of tons of krill per year and began har-
vesting commercially in 1967. 2 Since 1969, Soviet commercial
fleets have fished throughout the Southern Ocean.) The
Japanese have also put much effort into the krill fishery.
In 1972-7), the vessel CHIYODA MARU caught 59 tons of krill.
During the 197)-74 season, the Japanese catch rose to 646
tons and in the 1974-75 season, to about 2,600 tons. 4
Apparently the market in Japan is being successfully developed
utilizing the products mentioned earlier in this study.
Chile in 1974-75 reported a catch of 64 tons. The Federal
Republic of Germany and Poland began systematic exploration
of the southwest Atlantic and extreme southeast Pacific areas,
apparently achieving rates of catch high enough to ~uggest an
economical system of harvesting (assuming a market can be
developed).
The season of 1976-77 produced a great intensification and
expansion of the fishing effort. During this season, the
Japanese engaged five or six vessels. Poland supported a
)Earthscan, p. 210.
4Eddie, p. 5.
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fisheries research vessel and at least four commercial traw-
lers. The German Democratic Republic and Taiwan also sent
fishermen to the area. Taiwan reported 130 tons of krill
caught within eighteen days. The Chileans chartered a
Spanish stern trawler of 1,500 GRT and ),000 SHP. The Nor-
wegians also carried out some scientific work regarding the
exploitation of krill. 5
To summarize, Japan and the USSR are actively and routinely
engaged in harvesting and marketing and had invested about
$170 million each by 1975. 6 Japanese and Soviet products are
of high unit value and low tonnage potential (as in krill
pate). Only recently have either of them seriously considered
a krill-meal of sorts. Exploratory fishing and attempts at
product development have been taken up by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Chile,
Poland, Taiwan, South Korea, France, and Norway. These in-
clude trials in using krill for both animal feed and human
consumption. There are no present or proposed krill fishing
operations by the United States.
During the early stages of development, effective methods of
capture had not been identified and some inneffective and
5I bi d . , p. 6.
6Earthscan, p. 209.
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unorthodox types of fishing gear were used.? Catches were
limited by lack of satisfactory processing technology and by
lack of effective fishing methods. The technological problem
has been solved. A more tenacious barrier is the problem of
product and market development. Also, estimates of the geo-
graphical distribution and concentration and overall magni-
tude of the resource must be more accurately validated.
Catch statistics given above were derived from very limited
data, as countries are reluctant to share the knowledge.
Science
Scientific research forms the basis for the majority of
Antarctic international cooperation. It may be considered
the forefront of national and international Antarctic policy
of interested states. Basic scientific involvement, though,
stems form curiosity about the unique environment which is
almost entirely untouched by man. Antarctic influence on
atmospheric circulation and ocean currents is tremendous.
Global climatic change may be easily mon~~ored. Past cli-
matic conditions have left a record in the ice cap dating
back tens of thousands of years. Geologists are uncovering
major support for the theory of continental drift. Biologists
have to deal with as yet unknown species which have undergone
extraordinary evolutionary adaption. Most research is
conducted during the less severe summer season (October
?There has been discussion of the possibility of harves-
ting krill through the introduction of harvestable predators
such as salmon. Ibid., p. 210.
51
through March), but a small cadre of scientists do overwinter. 8
The Antarctic summer population is presently between five and
six thousand. In 1976 there were thirty-four bases plus nine
on subantarctic islands. 9 International cooperation between
and among these scientific groups has become the accepted prac-
tice since it is both practical and mutually beneficial. For
example, Argentina has provided transportation and logistic
support for United States biological teams and has allowed
the United States use of some of their facilities. The United
States and four other nations man an Antarctic Weather Center
in Melbourne, Australia. In 1975 a traverse was made across
the unknown Polar Plateau by an American team with a Belgian
and Norwegian. Chilean scientists also participate in Amer-
ican activities and in the past have provided necessary emer-
gency relief. The United States and New Zealand provide each
other with logistic support. 10 There have also been United
States cooperative projects with Japan, South Africa and the
United Kingdom. All of this activity has been undertaken within
8About 750 in 1976 - 34% Soviet, 15%-Argentinan, 11% U.S.,
9% Australian, 8% U.K. and the remainder from Chile, France, Ja-
pan, South Africa, and New Zealand. Ibid., p. 204.
9Eight for Argentina, 9 for the U.S.S.E., 5 for the U.K.,
4 for the U.S., 3 for Australia and Chile, 2 for South Africa,
and 1 each for Japan, New Zealand, and France. For the sub-
antarctic islands: 3 for France, 2 each for South Africe and the
U.K., 1 each for Australia and New Zealand. Poland acceded
to the Treaty in 1961 and established a permanent station dur-
ing the 1976/77 season. Netherlands is considering resuming re-
search. Ibid., pp. 204,222.
10press release - Office of the
tary (May 1, 1965) in UIS. Congress,
eign Relations, US Antarctic Policy.
committee On Oceans and International
1st sess., (1075): p. 29.
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the framework of the Antarctic Treaty.
Science, though, is not the sole stimulus for the activity.
It is interesting and a little suspicious that even though
present activities are not to prejudice any stance on terri-
torial claims. all scientific bases of claimant states lie
within their claimed sectors. Such placement of bases may sig-
nify an attempt to satisfy the international law requirement
of effective occupation for establishment of claims.
Claims
Seven formal claims were made between 1908-46 by Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom leaving about 15% of the continent unclaim~d.11 The
United States has rejected all existing claims, but along with
the Soviet Union, reserves its historic rights to a portion of
the Antarctic. 12 Argentina and Chile are most adamant about
maintaining their stance on the claims issue. Australia, with
-
the biggest claim, takes a hard line and is increasingly alin-
ing itself with Chile and Argentina. 13New Zealand and Norway
seem to take the most flexible positions.
11Brazil, which acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1975,
has apparently made a recent territorial assertion overlapping
Argentina's claim. This is impossible, though, under the Treaty
to which Brazil is now bound. Earthscan, p. 222.
12 "" . "Barnes, James, Remarks In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Antarctic Living Marine
Resource Ne" otiations. . Hearin before the National Ocean Folic
Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess.. 1978 :p. 37.
13Earthscan, p. 221.
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Outside Initiatives
The Group of 77 with their demand for a New International Econo-
mic order are pres .suring the Consultative Powers for a say in
the regime and some benefit from the krill harvest. Guinea,
in a strong 1976 speech at FAO on the less-developed country
(LDC) need for protein, asked for equal control over the FAO/
UNDP Antarctic Program by 'developed' and 'less-developed'
countries. 14 LDC interests will need to be considered in
any equitable and successful krill management regime.
The European Economic Community (EEC) has become a problem by
taking the position that it is entitled (through member coun-
tries: Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom) to become a
full negotiating party and participate in the ~ecisive' meet-
ing on a conservation regime for Antarctic marine living re-
sources. The U.S.S.R. and Poland are opposed to acceptance of
the EEC. The United States and some others would not mind as
long as the EEC did not have a vote on m~~ters outside its compe-
tence or take the position that individual EEC countries can-
not speak for themselves under the convention. 1S
Several nations are becoming more interested and active in the
14Earthscan, p. 222.
15I t is though that this may arise from a dispute within
the EEC over who has final word on certain decisions. French
and British possessions and claims in the Southern Ocean have
been exempted from the EEC Common ~isheries Policy. Barnes,
Special Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires.
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practice of krill fishing. Scientific research is being car-
ried out independently and cooperatively by several nations.
St a t es not included within the Antarctic Treaty "Club" are
beginning to assert their interest in benefit from Antarctic
resource exploitation. The New International Economic Order
is calling for representation by LDC's in decisions which
concern the international community. Krill management deci-
sions are of concern to the international community. The Con-
sultative ~arties, though, all want to maintain the Treaty and
are concerned with outside initiatives. Actions by FAOjUNDP
and UNEP have brought negative reactions from the Treaty Powers.
Several international agreements, however, have implications
for the Antarctic which may influence the administration of
the present Antarctic "Club" with regard to marine living re-
sources.
Chapter VI
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea
What effects do the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea have upon marine resource acquisition within the area south
of 60 0 South latitude? The answers follow the whim of inter-
pretation. Before delving into this section, it should be not-
ed that not all of the Antarctic Treaty Powers are party to
all of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. Of the Consulta-
tive Parties, only the United States, United Kingdom, South
Africa and Australia have ratified all four of these conventions.
Denmark is the only acceding state with ratification of the
four conventions.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone1
Consultative States party to this convention (in force 10 Sept-
ember 1964) includ~: Australia, Belgium, Japan, South Africa,
the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Antarctic Treaty Parties which have not ratified this convention
are all claimant states (Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand
and Norway) except for the newest arrival (Poland). Brazil is
the only acceding state of the Antarctic Treaty Group which
has failed to ratify this convention.
The problem with application of this convention is one of in-
terpretation of the issue of sovereignty over the Antarctic
l U.S• Department of State, "1958 Convention on the Te'l:"ri-
torial Sea and.Contiguous Zone,""U.S. Treaties and Other Inter-
national Agreements, TIAS 5639.
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Continent. A claim to a Territorial Sea or Contiguous Zone
must be based on a nations sovereignty over the adjacent land
mass. Article 1 of this 1958 Geneva Convention says:
1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land
territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea ad-
_.jacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised sUbject to the provi-
sions of these articles and to other rules of internation-
al law.
Consider Article 2:
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed
and subsoil.
Comparison of these first two articles reveals two noted weak-
nesses. The extent of the territorial sea is not designated
and the "coastal state" in Article 2 is not defined. Because
of these undefined terms, maya special case be made for the
Antarctic where "Consultative State" could be substituted for
"coastal s ta'ta'", thereby, allowing the Treaty Powers to estab-
lish a territorial sea to cover the entire treaty area? Is it
possible for a condominium (one of the selected options,p.~)
since joint sovereignty is exercised, to ~~tablish a territor-
ial sea? The questions are left in an ambiguous condition by
this Geneva Convention.
Convention on the High Seas2
Consultative States party to this convention include Australia,
Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa, Soviet Union, United King-
2U• S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on the High
Seas,ll u.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS
5200.
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dom and the United States. Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand
and Norway are not party. Of the six acceding states, Brazil and
the Net h er l ands are not party. If final concensus holds that
high seas around the Antarctic continent begin at the low water
mark, as argued by the United States, provisions of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas (in force JO September 1962) will be
applicable.
"High seas' are defined as all seas not included in the territorial
sea or internal waters of a State (Article 1 of High Seas Conven-
tion). Therefore, if it is illegal to establish a territorial sea
around the Antarctic then the waters are by definition "high seas·.
According to Article 2 of the High Seas Convention:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to sUbject any part of them to its sover-
eignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and non-coastal States:
1) Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
J) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the
general principles of international ~aw, shall be exer-
cised . by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.
It should be noted that these four freedoms may not be exclusive.
The Antarctic marine environment may thus be vulnerable to the
high seas freedoms of the world community. Without some sort
of specific management provisions, environmental protection of
the area will be impossible.
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Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources
of the High seas3
Once again, applicability will depend upon the nature of the
waters surrounding the Antarctic. States party to this Con-
vention (in force 10 March 1966) which are also party to the
Antarctic Treaty include Australia, Belgium, France, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Argentina
Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Poland are not party.
Of the six acceding nations of the Antarctic Treaty Group,
only Denmark and the Netherlands are signatories.
The essential aspects of this Convention are contained in
Article 1:
1. All States have the right for their nationals to en-
gage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their
treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of
coastal States as provided fo~ in this Convention, and
(c) to the provisions contained in the following articles
concerning conservation of the living resources of the
high seas.
2. All States have the duty to adop~~ or to cooperate
with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas.
'Conservation' is defined in Article 2 in terms of rendering
possible the optimum sustainable yield. Article 3 requires
States to adopt all necessary conservation measures. Inter-
national agreement on conservation measures is called for by
Article 4 in the case of two or more nations fishing the same
3U•S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas," U.S.
Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 5969.
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stock. If negotiations fail, the coastal state may adopt
unilateral high seas conservation measures under Article
6.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Re-
sources of the High Seas stresses that krill fishing nations
enter into some sort of conservation agreement. The Convention,
though, is not declaratory and has been relatively weak. De-
termination of when conservation measures are "necessary" as
provided in Article 3 will differ with each of the krill fish-
ing nations. It should also be noted that the most active
Antarctic fishing nations, Japan and the Sov1et Union, have
not ratified the Convention. 4
Convention on the Continental Shelf5
Consultative Powers party to the Convention on the Continental
Shelf (in force 10 June 1964) are Australia, France, New Zea-
land, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
----
and the United States. Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Japan,
and Poland are not party to this Convention. Of the Antarctic
Treaty Group acceding states, only Brazil is not party.
4Non-ratification by the U.S.S.R. is primarily due to the
unwillingness of the Soviets to accept any system of compulsory
arbitration as provided by Articles 9, 10 and 11. Koers, Albert,
International Re lation of Marine Fisheries (Fishing News
Books Ltd., Surrey, England, 1973 : p. 118.
Su.S. Department of State, "1958 Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, It U.S. Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments, TIAS 5578.
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The Continental Shelf articles refer to the seabed and sub-
soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast and are.
therefore. not applicable to a krill management regime. Off-
shore mineral resources will fall under the legalities of this
Convention.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea fail to
provide concrete guidance for krill management. States are
reluctant to give up any prerogatives in favor of international
law and will. therefore. interpret these Conventions to their
benefit. Freedom of fishing and conservation do not go hand-
in-hand. The problem is one of finding a balance between the
fishing and non-fishing nations regarding conservation. Both
the lack of accepted procedure for defining the objectives
of international law and the lack of communication _among na-
tions augments the challenge of specifying krill management
measures.
The context of international marine fish~!jes treaty law is
dynamic in nature and sUbject to continuous change. 6 The third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
may assist in clearing some of the ambiguities found in the
1958 Conventions. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(ICNT) is the latest working document borne by delegations to
the present Iaw of the Sea Conference. The ICNT is absent of
any reference to the Southern Ocean or the Antarctic Treaty
6:Koers. p. 38.
61
Area, but as with the 1958 Geneva Conventions has implica-
tions which will be considered in the next chapter.
Chapter VIr
Potential Impact of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text
Sovereignty over the land mass and the surrounding waters is
central to the question of the extent of influence exerted by
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).l The Antarc-
tic Treaty provides no special rights for the Antarctic Treaty
Group (ATG) with respect to high seas. Depending on the in-
terpretation of the status of the waters within 200 miles of
the Antarctic land mass, the international community may have
purview over the entire Southern Ocean. ICNT provisions appli-
cable to the High Seas will then have to be weighed in the
management of these waters. If it is assumed that territorial
seas and EEZ's may be implemented, the sovereign state(s) will,
of course, have much more control. However, certain provisions
of the rCNT will still merit attention.
High Seas
High Seas within the Treaty area will be sUbject to Part VII2
of the rCNT. The essence of this part with regard to krill
is asserted in Article 87:
Freedom of the high seas comprises, inter alia, ... Free-
dom of fishing.
Unprotected by either the Antarctic Treaty or the rCNT or the
1958 Geneva Conventions, the krill resource may become victim
of the 'commons' tragedy. If the fishing grounds are designat-
ed as High Seas, a separate international managemont scheme
lInformal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Dec. A/Conf. t
62/WP. 10 (1977) is the outcome of the Sixth Session of UNClOS.
(Hereafter cited as lCNT)
2I CNT, Part VII - High Seas.
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will be needed in order to protect this resource. This is
especially true in light of Article 89:
No state may validly purport to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty.
This article is mentioned not to advocate individual man-
agement by many states, but because of its added influence
in keeping the fishing areas open to the international commun-
i ty.
Exclusive Economic Zone
Assuming the claimant states and/or the ATG are able to estab-
lish an EEZ, the international community may still have a right
to influence decisions. An EEZ is limited by Article 57 to
not more than 200 nautical miles.) The United States is of
-
the opinion that the waters within the EEZ should be consid-
ered high seas. 4 Article 56 gives the coastal state "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources." "Sovereign rights" are
not the same and do not imply the same powers as "sovereignty".
Article 61 grants the coastal state the power to determine the
allowable catch, but also mentions that "special requirements
of developing countries" must be considered. Though not at-
tempting to minimize the power of the Coastal State, the notion
that the international community will still have reason to de-
'rCNT, Part V - Exclusive Economic Zone .
4Control of "creeping jurisdiction" is the apparent rea-
son for this stance.
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mand access to krill resources is noteworthy. This point
is important because it reinforces the need for a defini-
tive marine resource management regime. The EEZ is not
specifically a zone of sovereignty. The lack of definition
of limitations on "sovereign rights" and on the "special re-
-quirement of developing countries" leaves much open for de-
bate. The position of the Consultative Powers is somewhat
strengthened by the recognition of historical rights in
Article 62. 5 However, the righ~ of land-locked (LL) states
under Article 69 to "participate in the exploitation of the
living resources of the EEZ's of adjoining states" may lead
to a mass of claims. Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lesotho, Mongolia, Paraguay,
Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, and Switzerland are all LL states
which border a member of the ATG. Unless a s~para~e legal re-
gime is set up for the Antarctic so that the resources within
200 miles of the coast are managed by a specific group of
states, independent nations may claim overlapping EEZ's. Since
the distinctive Antarctic marine resources are so far removed
geographically from the rest of the world, nations without the
technology to exploit these resources may claim 'geographic
disadvantage' under Article 70. The potential situation is one
which may leave control over the Antarctic living marine re-
sources in a state of flux with no discernable rational scheme
for management.
5I t should be noted that "historical" rights may not be)
as yet, established. The quality of the rights under this Art-
icle is questionable.
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Management and Conservation
Management and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas is discussed under Part VII of the ICNT. 6 An in-
ternational treaty to affect a rational approach to krill
management is recognized by Article 116:
All states have the right for their nationals to engage
in fishing on the High Seas subject to (a) Their treaty
obligations.
The caveat is that if there is no treaty obligation then no
stipulations could be placed on the harvest. How may states
be coerced into ad9pting conservation measures? A state's
duties to adopt conservation measures and cooperate with other
states in management are asserted in Articles 117 and 118.
Clearly a mere duty is not enough to convince a nation that
it must make a sacrifice. States must be convinced that it
is in their national interests to consider the possibility
of limiting and sharing the catch. Shares in the resource
will circumvent much political turmoil which would be cata-
lyzed by the omission of interested states from the manage-
ment regime. Persuasion to limit the catch will be more diff-
icult. Some nations believe krill to be so abundant that
there is no evident need for restraint. Scientific data is,
as yet, inadequate to effectively refute this position. 7 The
argumen~of "conservation first" is weak when advanced to na-
6I CNT, Part VII, Section 2, "Management and conservation
of the living resources of the high seas."
7The trend in scientific opinion, though, is that krill
surplus is not as ab~ndant ~s o:igin~lly thought. Support for
conservation by Amer1can sC1ent1sts 1S strong.
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tionsin need of protein. However, an "ecosystem approach"
to management strengthens the pro conservation and pro man-
agement positions. Utilizations of the ecosystem standard
must designate the weakest link or the most vulnerable area
of impact as the prime consideration of management measures.
Nations may be more readily convinced of the need for a re-
gime employing this approach. Article 119 of the ICNT sup-
ports the "ecosystem approach".
In establishing their conservation measures for living
resources in the high seas, States shall take into ac-
count fishing patterns, (and) the interdependence of
stocks and any generally recommended subregional, re-
gional or global minimum standards. (and) Take into
consideration the effects on species associated or
dependent upon harvested species with a view to main-
taining or restoring populations of such associated or
dependent species above levels at which their repro-
duction may become seriously threatened.
Protection and Preservation
Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine En-
vironment furthers the "general obligations" of states to pro-
tect and preserve the marine environment. 8 - Global and region-
al cooperation concerning such conservation along with coop-
eration in research and data exchange is prompted by Articles
198 and 201. Thus, even though these are "general" provisions,
a case may be made for the promotion of an international con-
vention for Antarctic marine resource conservation.
A new management and conservation regime may find Article 238
8r c NT, Part XII - Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment.
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to be a useful provision for circumventing the marine en-
vironment protection requirements of the current negotiat-
ing text.
Article 2)8 (1) - The prov1s10ns of this Part of the
Convention shall be without prejudice to the specific
obligations assumed by States under special conventions
and agreements concluded previously which relate to the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Thereby, a convention which enters into force prior to stip-
ulations of the rCNT will have priority. However, Article
238 (2) maintains that "Specific obligations assumed by States
under special conventions ..• should be applied in a manner
consistent with the general principles and objectives of the
present convention." This sounds like more of a recommend-
ation than an obligation as evidenced by use of the word
"should" instead of "shall". A krill management regime will
find little hinderance from this article which provides a
method to bypass many of the general orders of the rCNT.
The ICNT, if it is an adequate prediction of the final UNCLOS
III Conventions, is proof in itself that _~he Antarctic area
should be kept separate from the UNCLOS arena. The general-
ity of the standards pursued will not be conducive to ration-
al management of the Southern Ocean. If only High Seas are
found in the area, one set of consequences will result. On
the other hand, if territorial seas and EEZ's are allowed,
a different set of results will be seen. In either case, the
possible rush of states to exploit the krill resources will
create as many problems. The unique natural and political
setting of the Antarctic calls for a unique and integrated
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approach to conservation of the marine living resources.
Unless the Antarctic Treaty Group or some larger group of
states produces an acceptable solution to allocation and man-
agement of krill resources, there is little chance the re-
source will be cooperatively utilized. As will be discussed
in the following chapter, the administrative skill and mach-
inery for such cooperative and rational management of the
krill resource is already partially in existance.
Chapter VIII
Selac~ International Organizations Affecting the Antarctic
Several international organizations have interests in Ant-
arctic marine living resources. The most significant for
the purposes of this study are the International Whaling
Commission, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and
the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research. These three
have been most noticably active with respect to Antarctic
maring living resources and may play important roles within
a new resource management regime.
International Whaling Commission
Prior to World War II, several species of whales needed pro-
tection but international agreement could not be reached.
World War II supplied the needed suspension of operations
to give Antarctic whaling nations time to work out arrangements.
In 1944, a seasonal limit of 16,000 blue-whale-units south of
400 South latitude was set. 1 This catch limit became part of
the International Convention for Regulation of Whaling
(signed in Washington on 2 December 1946, in force on 10
November 1948) which established the International Whaling
Commission (IWC).2 Members of the Commission are: Argentina,
10ne blue-whale-unit equals 1 blue whale, 2 fin whales,
2t humpback whales, or 6 sei whales. Koers, p. 87. J Seasonal
catches before WWII had run about 24,000 blue-whale-units.
Gambell, Ray, "Whale Conservation: Role of the International
Whaling Commission," Marine Policy (October 1977):p. 304.
2Koers, p. 88.
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Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, Mexico,
Norway ,Panama , South Africa, United Kingdom, United States,
and the Soviet Union.
The major responsibilities of the IWC have been to propose
amendments to the Convention and promote scientific investiga-
tions by member states in order to review the status of the
whale stocks. Changes in the whaling schedule are to be based
on scientific findings and the interests of the consumers of
whale products and the whaling industry. Prevention of over-
fishing has been the inherent problem of the organization
because of differing national interests. Economic incentives
provided the foremost obstacle to agreement. Nations, under-
standably, wanted to recover their investments and see a pro-
fit. Tension between conservation proponents and industrial,
economic interests, along with a members option to dissent
from a majority decision of the Commission (if an objection
was entered within 90 days), augumented difficulties of the
IWC. Blanket quotas were set for the stocks as a whole.
There was no system of national allocation~ Competition to
obtain the largest share of the quota led to an increase in
the number of ships entering the whaling industry.J In the
early 1960's, Norway and the Netherlands temporarily with-
drew from the IWC causing the Commission to suspend its
quota limitations in order to prevent its collapse. This
JGambell, p. J04.
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basic controversy generated the relative failure of the IWC.
The excessively high catch limit of 16,000 blue-whale-units
was not adequately reduced for nearly twenty years. Improve-
ments in scientific knowledge and the pressure of public opi-
nion were needed before whaling nations ~ould accept reductions
in the quotas. Since 1965, the IWC has apparently had some w
success in limiting whale harvest to scientifically acceptable
levels. Another serious weakness was that regulation was
based opon artificial blue-whale-units, rather than on assess-
ments of individual stocks. In 1972, the blue-whale-unit
was eliminated and quotas were set on an individual species
basis. 4 It should be noted that in spite of its drawbacks,
the IWC may have actually saved some whale species from
extinction by providing a channel for public opinion.
Some have claimed that the IWC is insufficient for present-
day management. They question the accuracy of the scientific
basis used in decision making. However, an International
Decade of Cetacean Research has been launched by IWC in re-
sponse to proposals from UNEP and others. A new management
policy has also been adopted which requires much expansion
in research. The aim is to reduce uncertainties in whale
stock assessment and resolve problems arising from inter-
actions between different Antarctic species. 5 In other words,
4I bi d., p. 305.
5Biological Investigations of Marine Antarctic Systems
and Stocks (BIOMASS), Vol. I: Research Proposals (August 1977):
E~ H-63. in U.S. Department or'State, Final EIS, Appendix H.
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the HvC is beginning to employ the "ecosystem approach."
Whale stocks are now classified into three categories.
"Protection stocks" consist of whales which are completely
protected. Included within this category are Blue, Humpback
Gray, Right, Bowhead and some Fin whales. "Sustained manage-
ment stocks" are those whose catch is permttted in carefully
controlled quotas. Included here are some Sperm, Fin, Sei
and Minke whales. In "Initial management stocks" whaling is
permitted in accordance with somewhat higher quotas. These
include Bryde's, some Minke and some Sperm whales. 6
Six IWC whaling regions have been delimited. (See: Figure V)
It may be to the advantage of the Antarctic living resource
management regime to utilize this same system. Potential
-for impact on the whale stocks is increased by the fact that
krill fishing may be concentrated in the same open-ocean
areas and at the same time of year (October-March) as whal~s
are feeding. Studies have indicated that present krill
fishing levels in IWC Arre II (Southwest Atlantic portion of
the Southern Ocean) are approximately 1% of the total con-
sumed by whales in that area. Therefore, substantial impacts
on whales may be seen if the krill harvest is increased by
only a few million tons and concentrated in specific areas.
Another factor to be considered is the possible affect on
krill swarming behavior by a krill fishery. A marked change
6Gambell, p. 308.
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FIGURE V
Source: Bengtson, John T., "Review of Information Regarding the
Cons e r va t i on of living Resources of The Antarctic ~ari ne
~ c o s y s t em , " Final Report to U . 3. Ya r ine ~,~amma l Comm i s s i o r..
in Fulfillment of Contract F,~8 AD 0 5 5 , (July 197.3j in
U. S . Congress, Senate, Com~ittee on Com~erce, Scienc e
and TransportatIon, Antarctic living ~arine ResourCES
r e~ o t i a t i ons . H ari n~ before the ~a t i onal Ccean Foli ey
Study, 95th Cor z , J 2nd s es s , (1978) :116
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in the swarming phenomenen could also have a detrimental
result for the whale stocks. 7 Along with coincidence of
management regions, the 'catch year' for krill and whales
should concur. Reporting and compilation of data in this
way would improve management decisions. 8
Considerations of krill exploitation must necessarily take
account of affect on whales; therefore, a system of close
coordination should be set up with the IWC. Overlap in juris-
diction should be carefully avoided or provided for by some
sort of joint action measures. The International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) has
suggested that discrepancies between the two conventions may
occur because of:
1) Differences in positions of various states because
of the complexity of the science involved in decision
making,
2) Differences in decision procedures in the two
conventions,
3) Differences9~n states' members acceding to the two
conventions.
The discrepancies could lead to differences in priority
given to the recovery of a specific specie"s of whale. Regu-
latory provisions for special areas may differ. For example,
the IWC may consider an area to be in need of special
7AS an interim measure it is suggested by Barnes that
the allowable krill catch in each statistical area be no more
than 2% of the estimated krill consumption by whales in the
same area. Barnes, J., "Memo - Special Consultative Meeting,
Buenos Aires, pp. 12,13.
8Everson, p. 135.
9IUCN, p. 39.
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protection in the form of a moratorium on fishing. If the
krill fishing in the area is not also ceased, the recovery
by whales within this designated area will be negated.
It may be impossible to avoid conflicts, but fundamental
contradictions between the two conventions should be ironed
out. A close working relationship, with mandatory dispute
settlement procedures, between the IWC and the proposed
Antarctic Living Resource Conservation Regime is needed.
Krill and Whales will be harvested from the same general areas.
Non-settlement of discrepencies in this case is not tolerable
in an "ecosystem approach" to management.
The Food and Agricultural Organization
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations is directly involved with the resources of-the Southern
Ocean. Its Antarctic interests are aimed toward better
utilization and management rather than purely data compilation
or scientific research. The two most important goals of the
FAO, as stated in the preamble of its constitution are to
raise levels of nutrition and standards of living. It also
strives to improve the efficiency of production and distribu-
tion of food and agricultural products. "Agricultural" is
d f · d . 1 di f' h' d' 10e 1ne as 1nc u 1ng 1S er1es an mar1ne products.
10Article I in the Constitution. Koers, p. 104.
76
COFI and ACMRR
The FAa Committee on Fisheries (COFI) was created in 1966
and has proven to be a successful concept. Even the Soviet
Union, which is not a member of FAa, sends observers to COFI
meetings. Its success is partially due to the fact that it
is not a regulatory agency, but essentially a forum for
discussion of fishery problems. Attempts are made by COFI
to realistically assess the effectiveness of international
arrangements. FAa also has an Advisory Committee on Marine
Resources Research (ACMRR) which acts as an advisor to the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Committee (laC) of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) on fisheries aspects of oceanography. It provides
a useful link begween the FAa and the scientific community.
The basic difference between ACMRR and COFT is that the former
is concerned with research and the latter with regUlatory and
policy matters. 11
Department of Fisheries
The FAa Department of Fisheries was crea~ea on 1 January 1966
for the purpose of promoting national and international action
with regard to the development and rational utilization of
marine living resources. This department administers the
fishery development projects of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP).
11Koers, p. 107.
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At a 1974 FAO "Informal consultation on Antarctic krill", the
Department of Fisheries agreed to:
1) Produce a bibliography on krill,
2) Update accounts of knowledge, exploitation and
utilization of krill,
3) Act as an information center for research plans,
resource knowledge, fishing techniques, equipment
and utilization questions,
4) Review the need for international action suc~ as 12
expert group meetings and joint research proJects.
COFI has decided that FAO should have no role in implementation
of management measures. This type of activity should be
purely regional, involving treaty-based commissions. There
has been quite a bit of disagreement on FAO's role in the
formation of conservation regulations. 130bviously, the formula-
tion of general guidelines for conservation is useless in
light of the diversity of regional conditions. However, one
of the basic knowledge requirements for management of the
Southern Ocean is insight into the amounts of living
resources taken each year. The FAO Southern Oceans Fisheries
Program (funded by UNDP) was started in July of 1975. This
--
program intends to compile and disseminate information on
the distribution, magnitude and present state of exploitation
and utilization of Southern Ocean living resources. 14
12BIOMASS, p. H-63.
13Miles, Edward 1., "Changes in the Law of the Sea: Impact
on International Fishery Organizations," Ocean Development and
International Law 4 (1977):p. 438.
14IUCN, p. 14.
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Froblems exist with respect to the Consultative Farties
willingness to accept initiative from a global organizatio~.
Fast hostility by the Antarctic Treaty Powers to outside
initiative has been noted elsewhere in this study. Another
area of concern may be FAD's ability (or inability) to fulfill
a major responsibility in the Antarctic. Some may say that
FAD resources are insufficient for their present operations.
They argue that the organization:
1) Has a lack of qualified manpower,
2) Is imbalanced in the area of operations between
production and utilization,
3) Dveremphasises resources surveys without adequate 15
emphasis on catch processing and marketing techniques.
These arguments are not conclusive nor entirely applicable to
the situation around the Antarctic. Consultative Parties are
unlikely to allow accession to the new regime by any state
with a mere expression of interest. The FAD will then pro-
vide liaison between the krill management body and the non-
member nations. Regular consultation, joint scientific
meetings and notification on major management decisions will
facilitate coordination between the two international bodies
to their mutual benefit.
The FAD has considerable membership of less-developed-countries.
The management regime devised for the Antarctic will be of
significant interest to these courtries. Many less-developed-
countries, for one reason or another, may be omitted from the
15Miles, p. 434.
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decision-making body of the new regime. For these developing
countries, the FAO could provide a useful forum for expression
of views and exchange of information concerning krill
resources.
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)
was organized in 1958 by the International Council of
Scientific Unions (ICSU) at the request of the 1957
IGY Antarctic Conference. Its area of interest is
south of the Antarctic Convergence with a few small
island areas to the north. The initial members of
SCAR were the twelve Antarctic Treaty Powers. Member-
ship requirements differ from Antarctic Treaty member-
ship requirements, being only open to countries
16
"actively engaged in Antarctic research." Inter-
pretation of this requirement, though, has changed.
In 1976, it was resolved that an overwintering station
was not necessary for SCAR membership. ~embership is
also open to scientists nominated by ICSU and to each
international scientific union federated to ICSU and to
the World Meteorological Organization.
Based at Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge,
England, this organization provides the basic channel
16I n 1967 Belgium closed its Antarctic base and has
not attended a SCAR meeting since.
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for dissemination of information about Antarctic scienti-
fic programs. Each member nation submits an annual report
of its activities. Full meetings of national delegates
are held every two years. SCAR is regarded as the
source of scientific advice for Antarctic Treaty Powers
even though no formal link has been developed. 17 Antarctic
conservation measures have been implemented on the suggestion
of SCAR. Specially protected areas on land have been
proposed and the Agreed Measures updated and modified
at the Consulative meetings upon advise of SCAR. Presently,
the legal and technical factors in krill harvesting are
b · t d' d b thO . t' 18elng s u le y lS organQza lon.
BIOMASS
-
SCAR participated in the development of a program of
Biological Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems
and Stocks (BIOMASS) which coordinates international
research on the biology of Antarctic living resources.
This ten year international research endeavor was initiated
in 1978. In broad terms the objectives of BIOMASS are:
(1) to provide data and information for the conservation
and wise management of the living resources of the Southern
Ocean, and (2) to improve our understanding of the energy
flow through the ecosystem.19 The principle objective
17IUC N, p. 7.
18Anonymous, p. 804.
19Everson, p. 135.
81
is to gain a deeper understanding of the structure and
functional relationships within the Antarctic marine
ecosystem as a basis for future managemerrt of living
resources. 20 BIOMASS proposals for long term intensifica-
tion of scientific research are concerned with inter-
actions among the resources. This approach to Antarctic
scientific investigation lends itself nicely to utiliza-
tion in 'ecosystem approach' management decisions.
BIOMASS is the first major international effort at coordination
of present and future research explicitly for the develop-
21
ment of wise management of living resources. As such,
it has several important contacts with other international
organizations. SCAR already cooperates with several inter-
national bodies including ACMRR of FAO, IOC of UNESCO,
and the International Association of Biological Oceano-
graphy ofIUBS. Financial support comes from tiE Inter-
national Council of Scientific Uions (ICSU), the United
States National Academy of Science and the National Science
Foundation. 22
It has been recommended that BIOMASS respond to relevant
recommendations from the IOC and Antarctic Treaty Consulta-
tive Powers. SCAR may be utilized to transmit the relevant
20BIOMASS, p. H-5.
21 I bi d., p. H-vi.
22BIO~~SS, p. H-vi.; Barnes, James N., Statement in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation, Antarctic Living Marine Resources Negotiations. Hearing
before the National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess.
(1978): p. 21.
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scientific information to countries involved in krill
exploration and exploitation. Also put forward are the
suggestions that IOC undertake the international coordina-
tion of BIOMASS and that SCAR collaborate with FAO in
convincing all parties involved of the pertinence of
detailed catch data. This would allow for partial
United Nations participation on th8 management of krill
resources. 23 Intimately involved in scientific investigation
of Antarctic living resources, SCAR would be no less than
a major asset to an Antarctic conservation regime.
Established relationships with FAO and other organizations
augment the desirability of a formal link with the new
management regime.
Many states are likely to want to participate in krill
management. A convention will be weakened if international
economic and social concerns are not considered. The
mechanisms for proper coordination of scientific investi-
gation, non-fishing and non-resear~h state involvement,
and overlapping management concerns already exist and
should be utilized within a new Antarctic living marine
resource regime. The proposed "ecosystem approach"
to krill management will not be complete without a close
working link between the new regime and the IWC. An
Antarctic living marine resource regime does not have
to contain specific provisions for whale conservation,
23BION~SS, pp. H-vi, H-69.
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but coordination with the IWC will facilitate protection
of the whale stocks. The ecosystem consciousness of the
BIOMASS program along with SCAR's function as a channel
for international dissemination of information about
Antarctic scientific programs indicates that SCAR will
be helpful with respect to management decisions by a new
regime. The FAO Southern Ocean Fishery Program has
already begun compiling and disseminating information
on krill and other Antarctic marine living resources.
There may be some overlap of this function with the BIOMASS
program of SCAR. Therefore, some collaboration of effort
between these two organizations would benefit the retional
management of the krill resource. FAO's major function
should not be with implementation of management measures
within the Antarctic, but as a liaison between the
Antarctic marine resource regime and the less-developed
countries and as a forum for expression of LDC views on
Antarctic marine living resources.
Several options are open to the international community.
The four options set forth in the next chapter are not
exclusive. They have been chosen because of their
obvious applicability and the fact that they are the most
widely discussed alternatives.
Chapter IX
Selected Future Options
International attitudes concerning the most appropriate
management scheme touch upon several differing options. Most
often discussed methods for resolving the problem of what set
of nations should have the management responsibility for Ant-
arctic living marine resources are: 1) The National Approach,
2) The Condominium Approach, J) A United Nations Regulatory
Body and 4) Negotiation of a new regime for the specific
purpose of living marine resource management (United States
position). Within each of these categories there are, of
course, variations. To utilize a certain approach in one
manner will make it acceptable to one group of states (group
A), but not to another group (group B). To utilize the same
approach in a somewhat different manner will alienate part
of group A and recruit part of group B.
The National Approach
Although this would be the politically easiest method, a
national approach to Antarctic marine re~~~rce management
will leave the fate of the ecosystem dependent upon the whims
and wishes of various individual nations. Attention to the
ecological balance of the area would be of low priority.
Overcapitalization by states in order to take advantage of
the initial boom in the krill fishery could have a noted
detrimental effect throughout the Antarctic ecosystem.
The United States Department of State asserts that the
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possibility of overexploitation is small in the immediate
future, but very likely as the fishery grows. 1 Unilateral
action to license fishermen to operate in the Southern Ocean
will undoubtably lead to what may be labeled the "Great
Krill Rush of the 1980's". National priorities will out-
weigh ecosystem considerations and, as evidenced in Garret
Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons,,2, short term advantage
would override long-term productivity.
If considered realistically, licensing by a state for its
nationals to fish without consideration for other states is
initially beneficial to very few and ultimately beneficial
to no one. The assumption is that regulation by individual
countries will be adequate or is uneeded. However, free
apprOpriation may allow developed states with krill fishing
technology to deplete the resource at the expense of the
resource needs and conservation views of the non-fishing
nations. Problems of limited management effectivemess,
inconsistent international practice and i~tability of the
fishery will endanger the security of any single nation's
investment. Unless coordinated through formal and/or infor-
mal negotiation of committments, no monitoring of stocks or
reporting of catch data will be required. The challenge is
1U. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 49.
2Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science
162 (1968): pp. 1243-1248.
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that of finding a balance between the interests of the world
community in regard to nutritional, economic and conservation
desires and those of the krill fishing nations.
Another difficulty encountered is evocation of the claims
issue. Most of the fishing will take place within 200 nauti-
cal miles of the Antarctic continent, especially within the
overlapping British, Chilean and Argentinean sectors. Would
such unilateral action by various states by a de jure abroga-
tion of the moratorium found in Article IV of the 1959 Ant-
arctic Treaty. The, as yet, unresolved nature of the seas
within 200 miles of the Antarctic coast leaves the question
open. Some may suggest that,with the special case in the
Antarctic}the applicability of international law concerning
sovereignty over a land mass may be reversed. If the claim-
-
ants are unable to refute the high seas argument and are
unable to establish territorial seas, contiguous zones or
EEZ's, are they still entitled to assert sovereignty over
the land mass? Those states which argue that the krill
fishing areas are high seas are, in fact;supporting the
possibility of a national approach to exploitation of Ant-
arctic marine living resources.
It has been argued by some that unilateral action may be
contrary to the purposes of the Antarctic Treaty and, there-
fore, a violation. The applicability of the Treaty to orf~
shore areas, though, is open to question. If this 'violation'
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argument is found valid, it would apply only to unilateral
action by the nineteen nations which have acceded to the
Treaty. The rest of the world community is not bound by
the Treaty provisions. On the other hand, the national
approach may be effectively supported by Article VIII of
the Treaty. Article VIII maintains jurisdiction over Ant-
arctic personnel by the state of which they are nationals.
Insurance of freedom of movement and guaranteed unrestricted
execution of function are the apparent purposes of this
article. Even in light of the freeze on the claims issue
(Article IV) ,jurisdiction over personnel within a claimants
sector may be seen as a contradiction of territorial sover-
eignty in the final analysis. Again, uncertainty is sired
by contrary interpretations of the provisions of the Treaty.
A demise of the Treaty, though, is not precondition for a
national approach by contracting or non-contracting states.
Unless a strong new regime is negotiated, the national approach
to exploitation of Antarctic krill will become a fait accompli
and may result in confrontation between parties involved.
The Condominium Approach
'Condominium' is defined by Von Glahn as a territory jointly
governed by two or more states. 3 Joint sovereignty in the,
Antarctic may be comprised of only states within the Antarctic
3Von Glahn, p. 78.
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Treaty system or be open to all states within the inter-
national community. The condominium agreement may be part
of the present Treaty or under a new convention. Once again
we encounter the disputes between claimants and non-claimants
and between the Antarctic Treaty Group and the world community.
It has been suggested that joint sovereignty could be nego-
tiated by the Antarctic Treaty Group under Articles IX or
XII of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Article IX provides for
dispute ~n this case juridical dispute) resolution by nego-
tiation or some other peaceful means. Article XII allows
the Treaty to be modified or amended at any time by unanimous
agreement of the contracting parties. Rose argues that such
an arrangement would offer final solution to the claims issue
with all parties sharing equal rights. Claimants would have
to relinquish claims, but would have sovereign rights over
the whole area. She also maintains that "clear recognition
of sovereignty would provide a settlement which could affect
the legal order necessary for commercial interests.,,4 It
may reconcile conflicting claims by asserting indivisible,
collective sovereign rights to all of the Antarctic and by
distributing the benefits of resource development among the
co-owners. Acquisition of scientific data would also be
facilitated. Already in a cooperative frame, scientific
4Ros e, Julia, "Antarctic Condominium: Building a New
Legal Order for Commercial Interests," Marine Technology
Society Journal 10 (January 1976): p. 26,27.
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interaction between the Consultative parties could be more
easily extended to cover marine living resources. A declara-
tion of joint sovereignty may enable the Antarctic to be
considered a "coastal state" and benefit from rights of the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea as well as
other rights provided by present Law of _.the Sea negotiations.
A condominium may not be legally considered a state, but may
be adequate to obtain benefit from these Conventions. By
providing for delimitation of the offshore areas, this approach
may also exclude an international authority, established
by UNCLOS III, from within 200 miles of the Antarctic
continent.
'Joint sovereignty' would incorporate the national interests
of all parties involved and may provide the possibility of a
permanent settlement. Several examples of past condominiums
have been cited as evidence of feasibility.5 These examples
are not of paralled nature with the overall situation in the
Antarctic and most of them were ultimately unsuccessful.
The problem with using other analogies is in the status of
the territory. In the Antarctic there are conflicting terri-
torial claims and a major treaty in force. The political
situation of the area is different from the examples cited.
5Samoa 1878 (United States, United Kingdom, and Germany);
New Hebrides 1906 (Great Britain and France); Canton and
Enderbury Island 1939 (United States and Great Britain);
Spitzbergen 1912 (Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union).
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Legal uncertainties corne to the forefront. One writer argues
that a consultative party condominium is unacceptable under
international law. If no authority exists to impose sovereign
control over individual sector claims, then there is no
authority to impose sweeping rights of sovereignty over the
entire area. 6 Gustav Smedal, though, maintains that agreement
of all parties concerned (i.e. the Antarctic Treaty Group or
Consultative States) is a valid qualification for the procla-
mation of sovereignty.? However, it may be argued that a
condominium of consultative parties would violate Article IV
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty which bar any enlargement
of claims. If this is so, an entire new treaty may be needed
to set up a condominium, in which case nations not presently
within the Antarctic Treaty Group may be allowed access.
There are several areas of difficulty to be noted. If a
condominium is comprised of states with and without consul-
tative status, the territorial claims of the seven claimant
states will be undermined. How will the -Jurisdictional
position of these claimants be appeased? It may also be
possible for consultative parties, through regulatory pro-
visions, to effect a de facto condominium (such as a joint
venture system), but this would exclude the non-Antarctic
6Anonymous, p. 843.
?Smedal, Gustav, "Acquisition of Sovereignty Over Polar
Areas," (1931) :11, cited by Rose, p. 27.
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Treaty Group states. What of access by those initially
excluded? A condominium may be a feasible solution as long
as the world community of 'small' powers is granted member-
ship and equality. The caveat here is that the 'small'
states must not feel dominated by the 'large' states. They
should maintain at least the level of sovereign equality as
j
that provided in the United Nations General Assenbly. However,
the condominium approach is not regarded as a politically
expedient alternative. Agreement will be difficult to reach
and in the meantime, the national approach will have been
adopted by default.
United Nations Regulatory Agency
Common interest in the Antarctic was asserted by India (a
leader of less-developed-countries) as early as 1926. More
recently, representatives from Sri Lanka have argued for
international control. 8 Therefore, the less-developed-countries
(IDC) have not acquiesced to permanent rule of the Antarctic by
exclusive interests. The United Nations would provide the
broad spectrum of internationalization needed to satisfy the
LDC's. It is possible for the United Nations to exercise
some form of administrative control with one of its specialized
agencies. The FAC is the most clearly visible choice for this
role. A second alternative is for the United Nations to con-
vene an international conference to consider the Antarctic
8Anonymous, p. 843.
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question. This would bring many other states into the pic-
ture and marshall political pressure for their inclusion in
the final settlement. 9 The United Nations, though, has already
convened UNCIOS III. It was made clear in Geneva in 1975
that the status of the Antarctic territory is not linked
with issues being considered by the present Law of the Sea
Conference. President Amerasinghe of UNCLOS III stated that
"the question of status of the Antarctic is in no way linked
with the issues before the Conference on the Law of the Sea
10
and, therefore, this question should not delay agreement."
It is assumed that the Antarctic problem will only further
delay the already stifled LOS negotiations.
The establishment of an administrative agency would seem the
most feasible of the two proposed United Nations alternatives.
One author argues that a specialized agency of the United
Nations General Assembly would be the most suitable mechanism
and that a separate United Nations "Neutral Territories
Council" for the Antarctic could be established. 11 A new
administrative agency, however, is not necessary specifically
for marine living resources of the area. It is asserted by
Jessup and Taubenfeld that "the precedents exist for use,
exploitation, and administration on a shared basis, and a
9I bi d . p. 854.
10Quoted in Wilson, G., p. 5.
llHayton, "Polar Problems and International Law," American
Journal of International Law 52 (1958):p. 765 in Anonymous,
p. 854. --
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number of international agencies already in existence can
be utilized with relatively little further ado. H12 The FAD
has expressed interest in a joint program with UNDP to assist
in exploration and utilization of krill for LDC's.13 FAD has
the experience and technical competence which could make it
an effective administrator for global krill concerns. An FAD
Southern Ocean Fisheries Program with a northern boundary of
450 South is already in existence. Yet, for more effective
administration and management of krill it would be necessary
for thi s boundary to be moved southward to the latitude most
compatible with the Antarctic Convergence. (In the next option
considered in this study, movement of the boundary will be
unnecessary.) Aside from the advantage for LDC's of a United
Nations regulatory agency, interests of developed states may
also be advanced. For example, there may be insur~d continued
availability of the Antarctic waters for science and a settle-
ment which would continue the presence of a peaceful regime. 14
12Jessup, P. and H. Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space
and the Antarctic Analogy (1959) :p. 137-1~O, in Wilson, G.,
p. 59.
13Barnes, James N., Statement in U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Antarctic
Livin Marine Resources Ne otiations. Hearin before the
National Ocean Policy Study, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978):
p. 36.
14Britain, Chile and Argentina may make a graceful exit
from the longstanding feud of overlapping offshore claims.
Anonymous, p. 858.
The Unlikely assumption here is that these states will
accept the United Nations regulatory solution.
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Doubt exists, though, as to the sensibility of abandonment of
the somewhat successful Antarctic Treaty machinery for the
political uncertainties of the Uni t ed Nations. The Antarctic
continent would have to be declared res communis and would
require states to forfeit all claims of sovereignty. The
Antarctic Treaty Group has reacted negatively to past over-
tures by FAO with respect to the Antarctic. With this in mind,
it may not be politically feasible for the United Nations to
intervene. To expedite a settlement, the best solution for
United Nations involvement will be to have a strong institutional
relationship between a United Nations agency (FAO) and a new
regime to be adopted.
United States Position
The United States is one of the principal players in
discussions of the commercial development and management
of living Antarctic marine resources. The Antarctic
Treaty is the cornerstone of United States Antarctic
policy. During 1978 Senate hearings on exploitation of
Antarctic resources, the Department of State asserted
that the creation of a conservation convention should
come from within the Antarctic Treaty System and be
consistent with the principles and purposes of the Treaty.15
15Mi nk, Patsy, (Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International Environment and Scientific
Affairs) Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources.
Hearin before the Subcommittee on Arms Control Oceans
and International Environment, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978): p. 19.
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Since the Treaty does not expressly prohibit commercial
activities, they will be permitted. It is hoped that the
activities will conform to provisions of the Treaty.
The United States has long maintained that there should
be free access to all parts of the area, except specially
designated areas, to develop natural resources under uniform
and non-preferential rules applicable to all nations. 16
The United States does not want to prejudice its territorial
position and has always reserved basic historic rights
to the continent. The right to make a claim is reserved,
but official position maintains the area as terra nullius.
Accordingly, none of the seven claims are officially
acknowledged since the United States does not recognize
that valid criteria for assertion of sovereignty have been
met. The 1924 statement of disavowal by United States
Secretary of State Hughes is the classic locution. "It is
the opinion of the Department that the discovery of lands
unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal
taking of possession, does not support a valid claim
of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an
actual settlement of the discovered territory. "17
l6Ray, Dixy Lee, (Assistant Secretary of State, and
Chairman Antarctic Policy Group) Statement in U. S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Antarctic
Polic. Hearin before the Subcommittee on Oceans and
International Environment, 9 th Cong., 1st sess. 1975): p. 16.
This is a minority view among the Contracting Parties
and would permit participation in a management regime by
nonsignatories.
l7Bernhardt, Peter A., "Sovereignty in Antarctica,"
article in U. S. Congress, Ibid., p. 95.
96
There has been debate over the "effectiveness" of occupation
and what in fact constitutes a legitimate settlement.
Though immovable in its stance of non-recognition of
claims, the United States does not want the new regime
to compromise the legal position of claimants or non-claimants.
It wouid seem that basic United States policy objectives
are governed by:
1) maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty;
2) protection of the environment and preserva-
tion of the ecosystem;
3) rational development of new sources of protein, and;
4) prevention of international conflict.
How may the United States best protect its interests
and position in the Antarctic? Solutions to the question
must consider that the United States has no claim or
krill fishing operation. 18 It may be in the best national
interest of the United States to have as many nations
as possible with a legal stake in the regime. 19
Resource concerns cannot be completely discounted. The
18 I t will take considerable investment for the U. S.
to begin fishing. We may be able to utilize tuna boats.
Shrimpers are not capable of fishing the Antarctic waters.
Wallace, Davi d . (Associate Administrator for Marine
Resources, NOAA, Dept. of Commerce) Statement in U. S.
Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Fisheries Miscellaneous. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Fisheries and Wildlife conservation and the Environment
and the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine on Antarctic
Fisheries Agreement, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977): p. 283.
Only the ~ast desirable area is left for claim,
therefore, it is not advantageous GO make a claim or
recognize existing claims.
19 Anonymous, p. 858.
Two main approaches have been suggested for determining
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United States realizes the possibility of detrimental
impacts from an uncontrolled harvest. A conservation
regime is being strongly urged because of the dangers
of large-scale fishing. A krill harvest is somewhat
limited by technology, though advancements in technique
and equipment are beginning to make it feasible for several
states. A treaty is not necessary to authorize fishing,
but will be needed for sound management. The present
diligent push for a conservation regime stems partially
from the realization that, once concluded, it may take
several years to enter into force and become fUlly
operational. 20 In the recent Environmental Impact
Statement of the Department of State, it was noted that
the United States may have to rely on lack of technology
rather than 'legality' to hold harvests well below the
possibility of impact for the immediate future . 21 A
whether a nation may participate. First, an "activity
criterion" would be enforced allowing only nations engaged
in harvesting and research to participate. The U. S.
viewpoint is that the convention by open to all states
for accession, but allow participation in decisions only
by those meeting an "interest criterion." - -
Ocean Science News (Nautilus Press Inc., Washington D.C. ,
November 13, 1978) 20: p. 5.
20Brewster, Robert. (Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs) Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources. p. 34.
2lU. S. Department of State, Final EIS, p. 49.
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sound conservation regime is required for 'long term'
management.
Scientific research is also of concern. The United States
has a commitment to both basic and applied studies of
the Antarctic environment. Perhaps an incentive to preserve
the Antarctic Treaty arises from the fact that freedom
of scientific research is being so restricted by the
current UNCLOS negotiations. Current policy for the
Antarctic is to strengthen and maintain international
cooperative research in several major scientific disciplines
in "harmony with and in reinforcement of the principles
and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty.,,22
Basically, the active and conservative United States
position is due to:
1)
2)
3)
4)
lack of data for rational management decisions;
maintenance of territorial stance;
scientific freedom, and;
_.
prevention of international conflict.
The United States assumes that the requirements for
effective conservation are not incompatible with harvesting
of living resources. Though the United States does not
fish krill, it realizes that much of the data will have
22Slaughter, John B., (Assistant Director for Astronomical,
Atmospheric, Earth and Ocean Sciences, National Science
Foundation Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreigh Rel a t i ons , Exploitation of Antarctic Resources.
p. 52.
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to corne from fishing and that a regime will make organiza-
23
tion and compilation of data easier and more efficient.
Therefore, the United States supports the negotiation of
and conclusion of an international agreement to conserve
Antarctic marine living resources. The agreement should
set forth the objectives and provide for necessary obli-
gations, functions and machinery for the purpose of rational
utilization. The United States will continue to support
scientific research and has made it clear th~ it would
contribute to the cost of running the organization. 24
Specifically, the United States wishes to see harvesting
take place in accordance with a conservation standard
incorporating an "ecosystem approach" rather than a
fisheries agreement along conventional lines. 25 The
following is an attempt to itemize characteristic points
of the conservation standard the United States would like
to see included in the text of the convention. There
should be:
1) maximum annual production on a continuing basis
2) maintenance of the balance between and among
harvest and non-harvest species
3) prevention of irreversible changes to the ecosystem
23The Antarctic Krill Boat Bill (H. R. 12668) died
in the Senate last year. The bill would have provided
a $20 million authorization to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to acquire a polar research
vessel to evaluate krill resources with the aim of
developing a commercial krill fishery.
Ocean Science News (October 16, 1978) 20: p. 4.
24U. S. Dept. of State, Final EIS, p. 64.
25Barnes, Jim, "Memo-Special Consulative Meeting.
Canberra, p. 4.
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4) coverage of all species south of the Antarctic
Covergence except whales and seals.
5) a commission of contracting parties with an
effective decision making system to develop, adopt
and revise conservation measures
6) an independent scientific committee to advise
the commission and publish reports
7) a secretariat
8) an obligation by members to provide data on the
harvest
9) obligatory compliance with conservation measures
10) close coordination with the IWC and Sealing
Convention
11) cooperative relationships with other Intergovern-
mentali~on-intergovernmentalorganizations with
simila~ or related responsibilities
12) financial obligations by members
IJ) provision for accession by other states when they
become active
14) no effect on the claims issue. 26
When asked which of these points would be absolutely
essential for a management regime from the United States
viewpoint, Secretary Brewester did not al!gw much
condensation of the list. In the Department of State's
judgment the following points are all vital:
1) ecosystem standard,
2) obligations and mechanisms for developing the
necessary information base,
J) commission,
26u. S. Dept. of State, Final EIS, pp. l-J.
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4) scientific body,
5) contracting party obligations,
6) non-prejudicial juridical provisions,
7) cooperation and coordination with other appro-
priate international organizations, and
8) provision to encourage all states with harvesting 27
or research activity to participate.
Brewster has also called for interim measures including:
1)
2)
3)
4)
observation of a conservation standard set in
the convention and of a ceiling on harvesting,
exchange of scientific data,
establishment of the means of coordi nation and
cooperation in collection and exchange of data, and
a commitment to ra~ifY the convention within
a certain period. 2
The ever-present issue of jurisdiction provides one of the
more difficult hurdles. Official United States position has
it that there should be no prejudicial aspects of the
upcoming krill management regime. The United States
maintains a regime can be put into place which will force
no nation to change its position in regard--to Antarctic
claims. However, the United States would like to see krill
managed by members of the convention instead of states with
27Brewster, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 35.
28u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, p. 5.
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recognized or non-recognized jurisdiction. In the words
of Department of State Office of Ocean Affairs representative,
Tucker Scully, "Hopefully there will be a system in which
the treaty would apply to areas beyond national juris-
diction as well as to areas where, in our view, there
is national jurisdiction.,,29 In other words, states with
jurisdiction would delegate specific management authority
to the new commission, but may still gain extra benefit
through license fees. The United States delegation to the
Special Consultative meetings has made no concession regarding
control of access to alleged EEZ's. In the view of one
delegate, the claimant states are attempting to enhance
their Antarctic claims through the mechanism of the proposed
living resources regime. Any yielding on the part of
the United States(and other non-claimants) would upset
the status quo established in the Antarctic Treaty.JO
The United States does not want the regime to function in
isolation from other international organizations or conventions.
Commitments undertaken by the regime should be consistent
with obligations under other international ~greements
pertaining to the Antarctic. 31 Of concern is which organizations
29For example, the Scotia Sea north of 60 0 South may be
claimed by whoever has sovereignty over the Falkland or
Malvinas Islands.
Scully, Tucker. (Representative of the Dept. of State)
Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Antarctic Living Marine Resources
Ne otiations. Hearin before the National Ocean Polic Stud,
95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978: p. 7.
30Barnes, "Memo-Special Consultative Meeting, Canberra,"pp.16,17.
31There has been little discussion at the Special
103
are appropriate and what the specific links will entail.
For example, the United States is concerned that there by
proper United Nations representation or contact. Specifically,
the FAO should be invited because of its series of programs
and interests in the Southern Ocean. 32 The FAO would be
invited in an observer and/or advisory capacity. On the
other hand, attempts to establish financial obligations
in the new regime in proportion to shares paid to the
United Nations has met with definite rejection by the
United States and some other states. The United States
also opposes entry of the Antarctic into the Law of the
Sea negotiations because of the additional burden and
delay which would be caused. It would be harder for
the United States tomfluencethe outcome at UNCLOS III
than it would with a small group of interested states.
Particulars of official United States position are difficult
to determine for several reasons. First, due to the nature
of the consultative meetings, the negotiating draft of the
Antarctic Living Marine Resource Mana gement regime is
classified and confidential. Details of proposals of all
involved states are held from the public eye. Second,
the United States position is a product of the opinions
and actions of several governmental agencies. The
Consultative Meetings as to how relationships with bodies other
than SCAR and SCOR will be worked out.
Barnes, Jim, "Memo-Special Consultative meeting, Buenos
Aires, p. 26.
32Brewester, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 24.
- '
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essential actors are outlined below.
The Antarctic Policy Group (APG) of the Department of State
was established on 10 April 1965 to provide a more specific
arrangement for the formulation of Antarctic policy than
previously existed. Orignally the National Security Council's
Operations Coordinating Board main~ained the oversight
function for Antarctic policy. This was dissolved in
1961 when the Department of State assumed coordination of
United States Antarctic operations. The APG was created
with the agreement of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Director of the National Science Foundation and with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary
of Interior. Membership in the APG consisted of the
heads of the Department of State, Department of Defense,
and the National Science Foundation with other agencies
able to participate by invitation. J J
The Department of State's Bureau for International Organiza-
tion Affairs had main responsibility for -the Antarctic
until 1970. At that time the Secretary of State appointed
the Director of the Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs to represent the Department and
chair the APG. In the same year, the National Security
Council recommended, and the President approved, the National
JJRay , Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, ~ S. Antarctic Folicy, p. J.
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Science Foundation to receive the bulk of the budget
for the United States Antarctic program. The Office of
Management and Budget approved the details. The Office
of International Scientific and Technological Affairs
has since been reorganized into the Bureau for Oceans
and International Environment and Scientific Affairs. J 4
Over the. years the National Science Foundation's funding
and management responsibilities have increased. They now
have the major planning, funding and management responsi-
bility for all United States Government activities in the
Antarctic. The Foundation provides funds for scientists,
academic institutions and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. National Science Foundation funds have also
supported Antarctic programs by th~ National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) I the United States
Geological Survey, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Logistic support is purchased from the
Departments of Defense and Transportation and from a
private commercial contractor. J 5 Such control enabled
the National Science Foundation to effectively enforce
provisions of the Agreed Measures for Conservation of
Antarctic Flora and Fauna until such time as they became
legally binding. The United States, on 28 October 1978,
J4I b · d 4___1_., p. .
J5Slaughter, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 50.
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ratified the Agreed Measures by passage of the Antarctic
Conservation Act of 1978 (PL95-541). The Department of
Commerce, in the form of NOAA, has also played an important
role. NOAA and its antecedents have been involved
continuously since the International Geophysical Year.
NOAA scientists participated in the major United states
survey work on krill in the 1960's and have worked on
krill estimation projects with FAO and SCAR. 36 According
to some reports, the NOAA has been slowly absorbing the
leadership role from the National Science Foundation. 37
The National Science Foundation will more than likely not
allow the leadership to slip away, especially in light
of the fact that the United States Antarctic Program
recently received a 22.3 percent boost in funds. More
than 70 percent of the increase is for expansion of research
on the Antarctic's ecosystem and krill. 38
The President, of course, must have a role in Antarctic
policy formation. In his Environmental Message of 23 May 1977.
the President assigned great importance to international
cooperation and United States leadership in the Antarctic.
36Leventhal~ Paul L. (Assistant Administrator, Office
of Policy and Planning, NOAA. Department of Commerce) State-
ment in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, p. 43.
370cean Science News, (1 January 1979) 21: p. 1.
380cean Science News, (22 January 1979) 21: p. 4.
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National policy is promulgated by Presidential directive
and devloped through the National Security Council. 39
Coordination among interested federal agencies with incor-
poration of the views of Congress and the pUblic all play
a part in development of our Antar8tic policy. Some
complaint has arisen because of the entry of resource
agencies into what was once the exclusive realm of diplomats
and scientists. Competition and conflict among policy~
makers is not unusual. The fear is that the resource
agencies are not concerned with maintenance of the
Antarctic Treaty.40
39S1aughter, Statement in U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploitation of Antarctic
Resources, p. 52.
A 1973 NSC Decision Memorandum stated that the U. S.
position would be within the bounds of international law
and that unilateral action by any state would be unacceptable. :
Rose, Julia, "Antarctic Condominium: Building a New Legal
Order for Commercial Interests," Marine Technology Society
Journal 10 (January 1976): p. 23.
40Rose, p. 23.
Chapter X
CONCLUSION
More specific guidelines are needed for sound management
of Antarctic marine living resources than those provided
by the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty and the Informal Composite Negotiating Text.
The effects of non-management are undesirable for both
the resource and the industry. Two prior Antarctic
industries have exploited their way down the path of
extinction. The whaling business, with its highly efficient
floating factory ships and unlimited range, combined with
the late arrival and ineptness of the International
Whaling Commission, led to the demise of both the whale
populations and the enterprise. The Antarctic Fur Seal
population was decimated in the later 18th and early 19th
centuries. This industry moved systematically thrqugh and
totally cropped many breeding colonies. The stocks were
left at dangerously low numbers. These seals were saved
from extinction because low population levels made
exploitation uneconomical. Likewise, failure to treat
krill as a renewable resource will have similar if not
more detrimental repercussions because of the important
role in the ecological system as seen in Chapter II.
The possible effects of uncontrolled exploitation are
understood. The question is not whether the krill stocks
should be managed, but who may have input into the manage-
ment scheme. As noted, several nations are already actively
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engaged in the harvest. No bilateral or multilateral
agreements specifically for krill management as yet exist.
The present unilateral approach to the krill fishery has
not reached an uncontrollable level. The fishery, obviously,
is not the exclusive interest of a single state, nor is it
reserved for a small group of nations. The cry for krill
exploitation benefit is heard from both developed and less-
developed-countries. Because of the speed with which the
fishery may develop, international agreement on a manage-
mant policy is essential.
The advantages of an internatior.al management regime outweigh
the disadvantages. Gains will be made toward functional and
peaceful reconciliation of the problem. National investment
in the fishery will be more secure. International management
of the unique and nearly pristine environment will aid in
1
scientific research and data exchange. Rational management
will aid in equitable distribution of benefits from krill
exploitation. Claimant states forsake the possibility that
non-claimants will eventually recognize tenuous territorial
claims and allow 'exclusive' resource management. ( Such
official recognition is an unlikely possibility.) States
such as Chile and Argentina will argue that the international
gains are being made at their expense because the krill
resource is mostly located within 'their' sectors. Con t r o l
1 Anonymous , "Thaw in International law? Rights in
Antarctica Under the law of Common Spaces," Th e Yale la'll
Journal 87 (March 1978): p. 857.
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by states over waters within 2ce miles of the Antarctic
mainland, though, has yet to be recognized. Th ey will,
therefore, be giving up something which is not understood
to be legally theirs by the world ~ommunity.
The Antarctic may be an ideal location for application and
testing of the theory of functionalism. 2 The krill resource
should be seen as a step in utilization of the Antarctic as
a ·.functional workshop for international political and
scientific cooperation. It should not be utilized as merely
a political arena for sustenance of conflict, but as a
cooperative pursuit of common interests. The national
selfishness of the states concerned can be utilized in an
organized manner by the development of economic and social
cooperation. However, agreement should not be postponed
until it becomes politically impos8ible to negotiate. Only
a few nations have the capital and technology for Antarctic
fishing operations. Frustration of less-developed-countries
caused by complete exclusion from any krill management scheme
presents the danger that they may eventually circumvent the
treaty. Folitical, environmental and economical disruption
are the possible results. If they find themselves at a
permanent disadvantage, the regime could be rendered mean-
ingless by future wild-cat operations. Na t i on s without the
capability to fish krill will wish to have some input into
2Claude, Inis, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, ( New York:
Random House, 1971 ): pp. 378-407.
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a krill management regime. To accomodate these nations, the
FAO should be incorporated into the new regime in an advisory
capacity and be used as a forum for expression of non-krill-
fishing nations' interests. The new regime, negotiated
through a special conference, should establish close working
institutional relationships with the United Nations (FAO) ,
I~C, and the Antarctic Treaty System (including SCAR) and
be compatible with general guidelines of each. FAO, I~C,
and the Antarctic Treaty Group alr8ady play important roles
in the Southern Ocean and have as members the principal krill
fishing nations. Each may assist in the smooth operation of
any Antarctic marine living resource management regime.
There are three types of membership provisions, as suggested
by Koers, for international organizations. 'Closed membership'
will limit the regime to the states which ratify the agreement.
'Conditionally open membership' will allow other states to
become members provided they meet certain re~uirements.
'Unconditionally open membership' will allow any state
to become a member. There are two possibY€ points-of-view.
One is that membership in internat5.onal organizations
should include as many states as possible. The second
holds that, in order to keep decision-making uncomplicated,
membership should be limited to states with an active
interest. Of course, the conditions limiting membership
should be based on factors related to the objectives of
the organization. Wh e t h e r or not a state is member of
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another international organization (i.e. the ATG or FAC)
should not be a limiting factor. ~emb er shi p in any manage-
ment regime for Antarctic krill should be open to or.ly
those states actively engaged in exploitation or exploration
of the resource. One reason for this specific limitation
is that membership in any international organization
usually entails financial obligations. States with no
interest in the objectives of the regime will have no
interest in upholding financial obligations and may have
possibly acceded to the treaty for some unrelated political
purpose. It is recognized that states with no present
active interest in the krill resource may become active
in the future. ~ith this in mind, 'conditionally open
membership' is preferable, assuming that restrictions on
membership do not result in the regime becoming an organ-
ization to further the interests of only its small group
of members. ~embership regulations must be based on sound
management principles rather than political motives of
the original signatories.
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~IULT I I TERA.L
An ta r r- t ic r ea t y
Signed at Washington December 1,1959;
Ratification advise lJy tht' Sen I e of th e United. States of America
August 10, 1960;
Ralified by the Presid ent of the ['nited Slales of America August 18,
1960;
Ratification of the [ 'nitel1 Slales of America deposited at Jf'a"hinglon
AugusI1 8 1960;
Proclaim ed by th e Presulen of the United S'ares of A m erica
June 23 1961 ;
Entered into f orce June 23, 1961.
Ih' TilE PnE':IDE:O\T (IF Til E C x rrrn ~T"\TE" (IF .\ ~r E HI C.\
.\ l'I{()( ' 1,. \ ~L\TIO\"
\\'lI EH E,\ f; th e .\ l\t:HTri,' T re.u v 1\ " :1 ~ ,i ~I1t' , I ur "'a;:hingt on on
D h 'i' lI d,..-r 1, l ~) :, !l hy li lt' !"l" I"-" t i,",, l oI ,'n il' ll!,' n riar i,', o f die L' n ited
~ l a ( , ' -; o f .\lll,'r i.';l . , \ r~" ll l i ll: ' . .Vu- t ri l i.r. B.,I!! :!!l l. ('h i l,', rhe Fn' lll:h
1:"l lId,li.." .Inp.u i, :; ,. \\ /' -:Ib ll t! . :;"1"\\' 1." 1:"-' i ' II ' (lIl Il [ ~' Jl llh .\1' r ic:l ,
t i ll' { ' Il itl ll ,, 1' ~(l I ' ; l'l ~1l , ' i :t1 i ,"r I: ,,!,nl. l i,','. :Il ,d ri ll' (' lIir,-d K in~c1 ()111 o f
( ; !"l':lt Brit a in :11l. 1 \"llr rllt' l"II [ n ,1a It t :
\ \ ·lI na:.I"; t h .. rext o f t lie -n i. l ' I' r v. u v, i n t Ill' E n g l i s h, French,
I: n, - ::I II, :11 11 1 ~1' : I Il I ~h laP !.!: II:I!! ," . i" 11, ' r . 1 f il l' wo re! a" fol lows :
TL\ S · I ~ I'O
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THE .-\:\TARCTIC THE.\TY
T hf' Go \"t~ r IlI Il P n l " of .\ r:.!'\: llt ilia , ,\ lI,.; t ra l ia , 1l"] :; l lIllI, Ch il l', t il
Fri-uch Hepllhl i,', .f :'l '" n. \ •.w I':"al and , );o r\\'ay. thl~ G nion of :-)" ilth
.\ . ·j" a, t he l 'ui on o f ~t) '; i" 1 ~ ,, · · iali. ;t {{ep llh li.',' t II" {'ni t ed Kincd orn
o f ( ; ;"' ,11 Brita in a lit! :\" '! ' !l!.'l'II I n -hu u l, an d ' t llt:' {'n itI'd ;-,ta[;" of
. \ I ' I ' ":t. '
1...· O)~ I ' i l · lI ~ that it i ,~ i r. r lu- illt l' r \:,.;1 p i .rl l muu k iu.! t hut , \ lI t a rcti.'a
"ha ll ,'0 111: ! \I " f " l'! ' \'t ',r I" he lI:,c,1 l'xl'!lI, j\'I'!Y f'JI' p"acpflll pu rposes
a nd ,;lta l l n" ! 1","(,' ; !II P t lu- ,-"" If' o r ol ,jed o f iu teruut i-uui l d iscorrl ;
. \ I' K II O \\ l: .l ~ i ' l .!.:.' t !Il' '; Il l ,~ an ti ,d ('llllrr ihll , ions to ,- (' i ,.'! t ific knw\'l rol/!p
l"l..':,ult il l:! fr '.l lI i l lt f' I'l I:11 i " " d cO' I(lI'ra : ioll i n ~;r- ' , ' nl i J i \ ' ill\ 'e:,tigat ion in
Anrn rc t ica ;
{..'onvince.I t hut t he {' ,..ra" l i,~ lt n \l' n l of a finn Ioundnt ion for tlH'
con riuua riou and d e\'e! fll ' ll l' nt of s uc h "ool,era ti on on th e ba sis of
fn' ed o'n o f scie ut ilic in vest iirnt iou ill A ntn rct ic.i a" applied durin/! t lie
I nt ernnt ion »I Gcophysi .:»I Y('a r an 'ord o; wit h the int erests of sc ience
.nnrl the p roz ress of all lI i :l ik inrl :
Convinced nlso that a r!"l'a t, ' t'lIs!II'ing the use of Anturct icu for
peaceful pllrpnsps on ly anel r ln- conr inuuuce of international harmony
in An tarct icn will furth er th e purposes and l>rilll'iples embodied in
the Charter of t he United Xut ions r]"]
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1. Antarctica shn.l l he used for peaceful purroses only. There
shall be prohibited, int er nlin, any mea sures of a military nature, such
as the estnhli shrnent of military ba ses and fortifi cations, the carrying
out. of military maneuvers, as well as the test ing' of nny type of
weapon s,
:2. Tho firp.-pnt Treaty "ha ll not prevent thl' use of rnil itu ry per-
son nel o r' eq u ipme n t for scientific res ea rch or for any other peaceful
purpose,
,A RT I CL E Tr
FrCt,,[,. 1I\ of srie ut ific invc st ignr iou i f, .\ nta rct ica. and coo pe r a t ion
II) \qrc! that I'nel, as applied during the Internut ionul Geophysical
Ypar, sha ll continue. subject to the provisions of th e present Treaty.
TL\ S 1, __0
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.\RTICLE II I
1. In order' to prUlllflte iut ernut ion nl coopcr.i r iou in ~;l ' i ell t i l i ("
inv est ig ut ion in :\n t,,,...t ieu, as provided [or ill A/t il'l f' II of rh., present
T re uty , the ('u lll r';lct !ng P arties agree t luit, t o rl lt' grp:tt.-::.t ex tent
f,"I,;il,le a nd p ra d il" aLI,· ;
(a ) in form a t iou J"I ' I_!':Ircling pl .m s for ", ·i.'lI ti tic pmg-r:lIl\ 5 in
Anrurct icn shu ll be eX"ha ngec! to permit mnxirnum ecol lolIl)" and
p!l j,' i (' !l (') I'operu t ions ;
(b) ,;eient itic p"r' '-' II Il £>l sha ll be exc ha nged ill Ant arc t ica herween
expecli t ions and sta t i " II.~ ;
(c ) scien t i fic observur ions a nrl resul t s from Antarct icu sha ll be
exchanged a nd iliad ,' f ...' ely nva ilubl e.
2. In implemeut inj; thi s Article, every encouragement sha ll be
given to the est ul.li sluuenr o f coope rn t ive worki ng' rel.irion s w it h those
S!,e.'iali zl'd Agelicie::: of th e L'nited Nations and ot he r inte ru at ion nl
o rgan iz:lt illns hu ving a scient itic or technical int e rost in Antu rct icn.
ARTI CLE IV
1. Xoth ing contai ned in the p resent Treaty shn ll be interpret ed as :
(a) :1 renunciation by un} Contracting Part y of previously
assert ed rights o f or claims tu t rri toria l sovereign ty in A nturrt ica :
(b ) n reuuuci.u ion or diminut ion by uny Con I [";lrting Pa rt) of
allY bnsis of c la im to territorial so ve rc-ijruty ill A nt.u-er ica wh ich
it, muv ha ve wh ether as u result of its uvt ivit ies o r lh o:'e o f it s
nat io/;ab ill Aurn ret icu, or otherwise;
(e) prcjudicinjr the pos ition of any ('olllra.·t ing Party as r('ganls
its recog nit ion or lion -recogu it ion of a n)' orher :-'tall" " right of or
«luun or L:I,-i,.; o f «l.um to ll'ITil ol,i;t! :'ol',' r .· i ~lI t y in Anta rct icu.
• j :\0 :I.'t,.; o r nct ivit ios takin;.! pla,',> wh i le IL l' pr,'~P l l t Treaty is in
force -h a ll con-t it ute :\ ba si " 1'01' a i= ;'l'rtin!!, :'n ppo l'f il1 )! or d enyin)! :\
rl nun tl) 1,' IT; t" l' ia l ,;o \'e l"l· ig nty ill Aut a rvt i... :1 Ill' .'l"t':Ut' any righ t,; o f
' . )\· l' r l'i .~ q J t y ill .Vu turvt icn. Xo 111'\1' rl n iru, o r " l:h :'g rrH.'nt of an
,'\; , ri:W " h int, to 1"ITitori al '::O\"-I't'ig llty i l l ,\lI la !',·t i.':1 , 1. " 11 1,,, a:,:,,'r t" d
',I 1 , : \ 11" ' t il 'l ,,Cl' l l ! Tn·"ty i:, in for l"-.
l. , \II,\' 1lIl"I t':I!' P:\I'!O:'!OIl" 11\ ,\n l:l rl'ti ":1 nn.l th ... d i, ]>n,a l t hr-re o f
1': I,Lo;[.,t in-- \1 :1.' (, ' 1"I II' r i:t! " It:d l l,P ! lr' lh iL i l '·ll.
. J III till ' c\"t 'nl Il \' II,,· l >l HI "ill :,io ll of int.-ru.u io uu l a ~ I't"' II\t' Il I " "011-
"I' I'!1ill .~' t i ll ' 11 :' 1' o f 1111 .·k ar "I :. ' r~." , i ll, l ildi ! l~ nur l.-ur ;·x j.I",.,itlll:- a lit!
>I :t· d i'<I,""al "I' 1': ltlj,,:It·, i\',' I\'l~t l' 1I1:1t !'l'i:tl. ttl \"'l i.·11 all .d' rhl' Con -
I I' ;( ,' ! 'I l~ 1':11 '1I ":' 1\ I" l'-( ' l't' l II't>," 1I1.1I i\ . ' ~ :In' . ' I : t u le.l ro !'an i.· jp:l t.' i ll ti ll'
1l 1t'1 'i i l : :! ~ (II·,)·.-i" .,,, t'lf ' IIl1 d "I' ,\ r li,, 11' I\. :1/'0 > p:1l1 iv-, ri ll ' rul e-, l''' i:t!,-
I, ~l. ,' d ' lIid\' I' - ,/,,11 :l.c:T I' I' llil ' lll- , I. tll :l l' l dy : !, ' \' ll: l r d i , ·:l.
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. \ ':TWI. F. v:
Thr. p" I) \'i ,..io n~ o f rhe pre"e l!~ Treaty "ha ll a p l' ly 10 t lu- area ,,011 111
o f filp ~Illlt h La! it tule, inc"Il.lin!!: ;11 1 i/'!' ..dIPIYt''' . hilt nothi ll!!: in the
p n ·.-;t·l\1 T ro.uy shall prejudice (II' ill a llY lI'ay afred the r ight '", or the
p ,;:t' rc i"l~ of 111\' r ig ht ", o f allY ~I a t e und er inr erun t iouul luw \\ it h regard
I I) the h i~h seus wit hiu that urea.
1. I I ~ o nli-r I II p r" l llo! t' lh t' "I,jl ;ct i\'l' s .uu l cn - ur» the ol--c rv nnce o f
rill' p r ' )\' i ~ i l ol l '" of ri ll' p rvscn t T ri-u t v, c.rch C IJI,traeting l 'a rty wh ose
l'l ' !, rl',:'[ 'IlLll i vr-- n re r- ntit I..·" (0 purt ivi pa te ill t lie ITll' l'tin l!" referred to
ill .\r-t id l' I X. o f t lu- T reury sh a ll ha n ' the righl to d l's igll a te observers
til ( 'a[T~ our a llY in :,!'edioll providr«] for hy the p n ';"f' llt Art icl .
OI>:' CI'\ ' (' l',=' sha l l hI' n;l! ion:d " of the ('olltrading' I'u rt ies which d esig-
nate t hom. T he n::I,jI'" of ob serve rs shall he comm I icnt cd to ever v
ot he r C"o lltnwtillg Pany IUl\'illg the right to d p sigllat e ol» -r ve rs , all;]
l ikv IH,r;, ',' - ha l] he ~i\"t' n of the n-rtu innt inu of their appointment.
,) Ea ·:h Oh:il!IT l' r d . ·"i~.malt'd in ac cordance with the. provisions of
p:trag-I :q ,h 1 of (h i.. A r t i,' I\' sh a ll IWH' complete freedom of ac cess at
anv t im- to nnv 01' a ll n rous of .\ n l :l rd ica .
i .\11 a rca; of ~\Il n rc t icu including all stnt ion s, in st ul lat ions and
eq uipureu t wit hi n Iho:' nrrns, :11111 all sh ips and ni rcru f t at poin t s of
d i ,;dwr!-"in~ o r ('mhark in~ ('a q! o ': 0 1' person nel in Ant: rc t ica , sha ll be
open at a l l times to iu s] "I io n h. ' any observers designated in accord-
nnce wit h pamgrap 1 1 o f I his A rt icle,
4. Aei-i al 01 rva ion may be ca r r ied out a t a llY ti me over :my o r
all areas of Antn rcr i 'a II)' any o f t he Con t ruct in rr P art ies hav ing th
rig-ht to drsig-natc obse rvers. ,
5. Each Cont rn ct imr Party shall, at the time when the p resent
Treaty enters into force f o r it, infonn the other Contracting Parties,
and thereafter sh a ll gi\'c them notice in udvance, of
(a) a ll ex pe di t io ns to anti within A nt arctica, on the part of its
ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in
or proceeding; from it s territ ory :
(b) all s ta t io ns in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be int ro-
duced by it. into Autarct ica sub jec t to th e cond it io ns prescribed in
paragraph 2 of Art icl e I of [he p resent Treaty,
. \ HTIl:U: YII [
1. In o rder to facili t at e t h» exerc ise o f th eir fun ct ions under the
present Treaty. a nd w ithout l' n'j lld i C'l~ til the re spective pos ition s of
tho Con r ruc r injr Pn rt ics rcl nt i iur to j u r isd ict i -m o ve r a ll ot he r per~on s
in Aut .urt ic«, obse rv ors d l' ~i ~! J:l t l'd under para!!raph 1 o f .\.rti cle VII
and 5['ien t ilic perso nnel r-xc luuun» ! umlc r subpu r.urrnph 1( i» of Arti cle
) II of till' T rvut y, and nu -mber» o f t he sta ll's accompany ing a ny s uc h
perso ns. sha ll ht' su bje ct on ly to th e jurisd icti on o f the Cont ra cting
TIAS ,li~O
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Party of which th ey are nationals in n -spect o f all ac ts or omissi on s
occurring wh ile they arc in A nt a rctica for th e p llrpo.:e o f exercis ing
their fun ct ions,
:? , \\' it hout. prejud ice to the provisions o f p :l ra ~ r r:tph 1 of this
Art icle, and pending the adopti on o f measures in (l UI-I UtTl of sub-
paragra ph l (e ) of Art ic le IX, th e Cont rac ti ng Parties COl cerned in
allY case of d ispute with regard to the exe rc ise o f ju r isc ict ion ill
A nta rcrica sha ll inuned i.it ely con s ult together with a view to rea ching
a rnu t un ll y accl'p t :lb ]e <;o! ut ion ,
ARTICLE IX
L Represeu ' I i 'es of the Contracting P art ies named In the. pre-
a mble to th e !JI" ":"llt Treaty sha ll meet. at the C ity of Canbei within
t wo mou ths a fl,' l' t he date of ent ry into force of th e Treaty, and there-
after at. s ui tul .!« inter-val s and places, for the purp 'of ex hanging
information, CO lI. u lring to gether on matters of common int ' I' st p e -
tn ining to A ut urc t icu, and formulating and co nsidering, nr U re co )-
mend ing to t l.e i r Govern ments , measu res in fu rtl.erun ce of the pri nci -
pIes and obj ectives o f th e Treaty, in cluding measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for pea ceful purposes only;
(b) fa cilitation of sc ient i fic res eurch in Anturetica ;
(c) facilitation of in terna t io na l sci entific. coopera tion in
Antarcti ca j
(d) fa cili tation of the exercise of the rights of ins ct ion pro-
vided for in A rlie e V II o f th Trea ty j
(e) qu est ions rel ut ing to the exerci se of juri Ii tion 111
Antarct ica ;
(f) preservn t ion and con servnt ion of li\'ing re sources In
Antarc t ica.
2, Each Con tract in g Party which h as become a party to the present
Treaty by accessi on under Article XII [ sha ll be entitled [0 appoint
represent atives to participate in th e meetings r efer red to in p:u':lgTaph
1 of th e present Article, tlm'in" s uch time as that Cont rnct in« Party
dl'lllolbtmtt's its interest in :\.ntarcti..:a by co nd uct ing s ll L~t a n t i a l
sc ient ific research uct ivit v th ere, s uch a" th e cst.ibl ish mcnr o f 3. scien-
t i fi e ~t a t ion or th e desjJatc"hof a sc ion t i til.' ex jJl'd it ion,
;3. Reports from th e observers referre•.1 to in Article ,"rr o f the
present . 'I ' ront y shu l l bl' t r.uist u it tcd to t he rv prvseu tu t ivcs o f the
t 'o llt ra cti llg Pnrt ies participat ing in th ,· mel' lillg;: referred to in pam-
:-r ra ph 1 o f th e pre,:pnt ,\r ti .·le,
l. T ill' 111'-:1,,111'<';: rt'f,' IT,'d to ill p :, r:lgra ph 1 o f th is Art iele sha ll
h l ' I'lIl1 l" p tl'." 1 11' 1' \\-h.' n ap jJl'lj\'"t! lrv :111 1 h., t " lI11 ral' l ill!! Pnrt ies whose
1" 'I'I'l' - "III:lt il'" " 1\', ' 1',' " l!li i lt'd III I;an il·il' all· in II,,· 1I;" d il 'g'S he ld t o
""/L- id, ' r t hll:'" 11l, ' : I:-li rv- .
. • ,\ 11\ ' 01' :11 1 o f I II . , ri~ h t " l,,,t:\I,l i-!,,,c! i ll I hI' 1'1'1''':. ' 11 1 Tn':\I Y lIIay
l., " "T,·i'.-..d :1" [ rrnu III,: ol a l.· of "11 11'.1' i ll l o f"I" '" o f rln- T reaty
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w lie t her or not any mc.r su re s fu c i Iit at ing the exe rr-ise o f such l'ighLs
h :l n~ been proposed) cons ilered or :l.ppron'd a" provided in this
A rt icle.
.\RTlCLE X
Each of the Conr ru ct iug Pa rt ies un .Iert nkes to e xer t uppropr-iut e
f'fi'o r t" , cons ist en t wit II Il ... ("(:artl'r »f rlll: ClI it f'oI \'"fltioll ", to the etul
t ha t 110 0 11(' Pllg "!!" ,; ill 'Illy u ct i vity i ll .\ lI tarc t i l~a con t rn ry to the
pr inciples or purposes o f the present Treaty.
"\RTICLE x r
1. If UIIY d ispute ari ses between two or mo re o f the (''''ltracti ng
Pa rr ie:; conCI'I'1! i 11I:! t he interpret a t ion 01' aP I icnt ion of t hi' pI esent
Treaty, those Cont !':1/:t iJlg Part ies sh a ll con su It among t hcmselves with
a vi ew to having the di spute resolv ed by negotiat ion, inquiry, ruedi-
ar ion , cnnri l i.rr iou, arbitration, judicial sett leruent or other peaceful
means of t hr jr own choice.
2. "\ ny di -put e of this charact er not so resolved shall, with the
consent, ill each cas e, of all parties to the di spute, be referred to the-
Int ernational Cour t o f .l t t iel' for sett lernent ; bu t f : ilu re to reach
agreement on reference to the International Cou r t sh nl l not absolve
parties to the d ispute from the responsibil ity of con t inuing to seek to
resolve it by any o f t h e various peaceful means referred to in para-
:,.rra ph 1 of thi Art icl .
ARTICI,E XII
1. (a) The presen t Treaty may be modified or amended at any
time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Par ti whoso
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for
under Art icle IX. Any su ch modification or amendment shall enter
into force when the d epos itary Government has received noti ce from
all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.
(b) Such modi ficut ion or nrneudrnr-u s 1;\1 1 thereafter enter
into force as to any ot he r Contracting P a rty whe n notice of ratifi-
cation by it has been received by the depo- itury (lovernrnent. Anv
suc h Cont racti ng P urt y f' rom whi ch no notice o f r ut ificut ion is re ceived
within a. period of t wo : e.t rs from the datE' o f l'n t ry into force o f the
rnodiflcnt ion or nrnend n " Ilt in nccordunce with the provi si on s of
subpurnrrru pl. 1(a) of i It:" .\ rt icle sha ll be d eemed to 11:1\'1' withdrawn
from th ~ p n' .3 n t Treaty on the dat e of the expi ra t io n of such period ,
.) ( n ) If aCk r the expiratio n of thirty y ears from t h-, d a te o f
I'nrry int o forc e of th e. present Treaty, allY of the Contracting I'urt ics
w!t O"l' rPJ)J'f'''''lIt:l l i '. , · ~ are entitl ed to purt icipnt e in the meeting" pro-
vidr-d for un .lr-r .\ It i,'k 1 X :' 0 request s hy a communication aclrlrl' :':'l'd
to r lie ( 1(' ['().~i t : lI·.v (f O\'erll!lll'nt, :1 Conference of all the Contracting
Pn rt ies shnll hI' 11l,1t! as soo n ns pruct icnhle to r eview the opera t ion of
the Trouty .
TI.\S 471'-0
(b) .\ny mod ilicut iou OJ' n moudureut to tIlt' prt-scnt Tr'ealy
which i" :q l(l"ll \·,.'d at -urh :L ('01\ f ..,[l'l 11'1' by :1 mnjurir y of the COli
t ru cr ill;! \' :I!'t il' " t h,'rl' n'jll" _"l'1\ll'd, i1\I'! u-I: II;! a 11I :ljflri t y 0 f IlaoSII WII! l',e
n'I'I'l'" ' ' l ,t .I : : '. ' '' a r,' on rit le.l t o paJ·ticil':1I 1' i ll t lu- 1I1""t illg.-> prov i.I.-d
for unrk-r Yr: i"I.., I X, "hall Ill' "1l11l11l1lIli i ' :11 ,',! I " , ( l iP dl'I", ,,ilary (;u',,'rll-
11It'll t ro all I h" l \m I r.u-t i Ill; I 'a rt ie" i 11111 11" l i.i : , !:. ;1 fr 1' 1' IIII.' term i /I a t i')1\
of till! COllft'p' Il': " alld shall Piller int o for.,I' i:, :l l 'l" ) i'da ll \"{~ with l lt n
provi s iou -, of paragraph 1 of t l. ..· present .\I'l id ,',
Ie) If n n v "ll,'" mod if..nt ion or a!!!\' lIol'"I'llt has 1I0t. l'lItl'rtd
iut o for"" ill ael.'l;rd:lli"l' with t lu- prov isi o n-, of .' IlLp a r ag ra p h 1( a ) of
this A rr icle wir hiu a period of t wo j",':Il'S afll'r rhc date of it ,,; l:O IIl -
munir.u ion to ali the Cout ract ing Part ics, allY ('ontr:u~tillg P;Ll1y
Illay at allY t ime uItvr the expirnr ion of t hat period give not ice to the
.le posi n u -y Gon'I'IIIllI'lIt of its wil hdra wa I from t he pre:".f'lit Trr-ut y;
and suc h withdru wal shall take etf,'t:l t w» years after the recc ipt of l lu:
not ice by the deposita IT GO\"L'rIlIlH,'nl.
AHTleu: XIII
1. The present Treuty shall ln.' s ub ject to rut ificut ion by the signa-
tory Stutes, I shall G\, 0 l ll' lI fur :\l't '\':;sion by any Stall' which is it
~{ell\l>l.'r of 1I1l' { llill.'l! Xut io n s , 01' by nnv other St a l l' wh icl, 111:1\' he
invited to acced e to the Trvnty w it h till! ('~n~nt of a ll t lit' COllL r;ll~ti llg
Parr i-s whose represe nt nt ivos are ent it lcd to participate in the
meet ing-s provided for under .\ rt icle I X of t he Treaty,
,) Rat ifica t ion of or accession to the present Treaty shu \l be
dfeetl"! by each State ill uccotvlnnce with it" cousr in.t ionn] pnlcesses,
3. Iust rumeut s of rut ificut iou awl iust rumeut s of acce:;"ion shall
he dl'!h),:;ih'<1 with the nOH'rn\l\l'llt of t he l-llitl·t! :-;tatl'" of Auunicn,
hpn-by dl'si;!ll:ltl'l! as rhe dt'(Jo:'itary c;ll\·i'I"lllll'llt.
-L Th e d"po,:; ital'y Ci0\ -1' I'll 1l11-nI -h .i l l i ll t"1l I'll I all ;:ig ll :lt o l'y .1I1l1
:l" ced ill;! :-;tatl's of rhe d :lIP of l'adl dl')lll:,it of all in-t rurucnt of rut ifi-
"ati f>l1 o r :ll'('l' ,:;sioll, n m] lIn' datI' of oru rv iut o Ior.:« of the Trv.it v nncl
of ~llY modificut io n o r :lI l:t' lI, l ll ll' ll l th,-! ,,-['II , '
;' , {-pOll till' dt'[ll):,i r 'I F iu - t rur ue ur-, "I' r.tt ifi r nt ion by all the " i!!l\ :l -
tory :-:I ;l(l':' , thl' prl' ~' " f r,':lly shu ll " nt ,-I" into fill''''' fllr rho"e :-:tatl's
n n. l for :-:t:l t" " wh ich I, . ,' d " ! '" S:I, 'd iu-t ru u u-nt- uf :H "'L':, :,i,)Il, Thorr--
,11'11 '1' I !It' '1'1' , ' :11v -h.i l! '' \It ,-r lid o flll',-" t"d - :11\ \ - :I" l-, 'd i ll'~ :-:t:1I" HP')ll
t lu- dl'I ,,,,,il "t' i r ~ i n-t : I H . .. · I ! t of ;It'' ·I,,,,,illll. . -
G, TI,l' ['I'I '- \' nt '1' : , .:y ,11,,11 I.t' 1',':.:- :,11'1'1';] 1.,\' t lu- d"l' ,,_- it:l ry (1'1 \-'
PI'II111 l'II t 1'llr - II:1 1l1 III ,\ ;-rid, - 1(1:2 Ill' ll ll' (h.utr-r of t lu- l'lIi'l"! ~ :i1i"II".
128
,\I:TII'I.F x rv
T!l l' 1'1"1':-'1'111 Tn·:\t\', dlll l" III !I \I' FIl:.!li"h, Fn·II.-1I, nll :,,,,j:lH :l lld
:-:! ':l lJ i,I, 1:II I:.! lIa:.!,-", \:.11'11 \"l'r- ilm !,, ' i, ,~ " " I" :l l ly ;11I 11: ,' lIt i,' , -h all I",
d" !,, .-i l " d i ll l i ,\, :In ,l, i n ' , lit' t l tl' (i" \, ' ;'I :III""l Ill' ,III' '-IIIII',) :-:Ial.,- .. f
\ " ,l 'r :' -:I, \\ 11;, I, -1" t11 Irall -1I 1it .1111 ,\ ""I'tlt il'd " lIl ,i,<, ,il. 'n·.. f (0 rh,'
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ANNEX II
Repor t of the Treaty
RF.PORT OF THE NINTH ANV_RCTIC TREATY CONSULI'ATIVE NEETllIG
TRATADO ANTARTICO
NovENA RElJ:'oo ION CON~ULTIVA
ANT/IX/83 (Rev 3)
Date: 8 December 1977
TRAITE SUR L ·Ar-.. r~" .... riQUE
NEUVIEME R~UNION CO."SULTA nve
LONDON
~o.e KOHCYJ1.TATlUHOE C08'!..l.1.1.AJ()ta
MHARCTIC TREATY
:-<lr-TH CO"'SLJLT"'T1VE MEETING
norosor OB AHTAPKTHnE
I. Fi na l Re por t
II. Recollll!l~ :ld a'.:i::ms adopted at l:06 Ninth Antarctic .1'r c;;. r. j
Consul~a~ive Meeting
III. Annex~s
~ '.
;
I
r
· 'ir _ /~
, ..
I
Speeches and Statements made at the Openi~B
Se6si~n
List ot Participants
Approval of Con9ult~tive Meeting R~coomen D t i ~~~
Message trom the COnsultative ~etin~ to stati~n~
in the Antarctic
Report ~! the ~orking G~up of Ex?erts on
Exploration and Exploitati~n ~r Antarc~ic r.incrals
Document~ on Tourism sut~itted to the Ninth
Consultative f'leeting and referred to the Tenth
Consultative ~eeting tor further consideration.
1.
5.
2.
,.
4.
6.
1 3 0
FINAL RE~RT OF Tt.1E NL'i7H ANT,l..RCrrC TaUT"{ CONSULT.4.TI'IE MEETING
1. In acc.,rdaoce with the pr-ovi a io as 'Jf Article I:< ot tho
Anterctic Treaty, representatives of the ~nBultative Parties
(Argentina, Australia, 5e~gium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealou~,
Norwal, Poland, the Republic ~f South Africa, the Uni,)l1 ot S-,viet
Socialist Republics, the United lingdom ot Great Britain snd
Northern Ireland and the United States .,f America) met in ~n£Jo
from 19 Septcmberto_?~~~:>b.e.F__1m to c"nsult together and
consider measures which might be taken to further the princi~le5
and purposes of the Treaty and, where appropriate, make
recommendations to their ~vernmeots.
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2. r~ Geo~e ~ll, Repre5ent~t!ve ~f the United Einc1~~.
acted as Te~p?rerj Chalrmeo ~t the r~e~ing pendioS the electiry~
ot a Cbalr::.ilO.
}. The r.eotin~ ~a8 t?rmally ?pened ~ Mr Ted R~~lBnd9, Y2.
P1iniste~ "t State t')r Forcl:o e:K1 C,)Cl!:n'")n'.'~alth Arra~r-s ~r the
Unitc~ Xj,n~d'")'II.
~. Kr Hall W4S thea ~lected Chnir~nn, Mr J~hn ~81lwo~d Jf
the. !'CO wa$ e;;?.,ioted ~ecre';l.ry-G~nel·&l B:ld :-'.r I9n Dunea a '); :::'c
FCO was a~?')intcd Assistant SecretBry Ge~erol.
5. The Opening Session .... as held io pubLi c , O.,e:li:1g g";e:;cr.lcr.t:::
...er by the ceads or ~el!!gati.,~s (ACU(IX 1) •
6. Tho r.ectins ad?;>ted tb~ t~ll"'0/ioe; Agenda:
1. Opening?f ~oetiog
2. E1ccti~Q or orficers
,. O;cning state~eQts
4. Ad~pti?Q?t agenda
5. Antnrct ic reaourc es - the que s t i an of mineral
er-ploratbn or.do expl o i tati.,n (Recon:ne::dati?n VI:i!-1 /1 ,
"pcrativc paragrs;>h 4)
6. ADtarctic cariDO!! Livin~ r-eseur-c es (Recol:'..wc:ldat;i~:l 'iIII -~O,
oporative paragraph 5)
7. Improvel!leat.,r telcco:n~uniceti.')ns in .\Dtare:;ica lln':! 1:
the collection ~nd distribu~:on 0: meteor1]?gical dot n
8. Effects ~r tourists and n10 g~ve~ental ~xpeditin~s
Ln the ADtarctic Treaty n.l'ea. COIQ;>letion of Annexe s ;.
8n~ B t'l Reco:n.rnonj'lti.,n 'JIli-9
9. Co_"peratioo in tranap1rt (Reco~endatioD VIII-7)
10. Man's impact on the Antarctic cnvlroOQent
11. Activities in the ~ntarctic of Rtates that are not
Cootractine ra~ties
12. D?cument6 of tn~ Consultative r.cetin~s
1~. llcvio·.. or c-mne rvn c i on lIleasur~s and Si;;tos of Spe c i a I
~cicnti(ic Ioterest
14. Date and p18c~ of next ~csultativo M~c~ing
1? Any ~ther bu~icess
16. Ad'")pti~o of ?inol Rep.,rt
17. Clos1nb o( ~eetiug
r
..
~ •• .... • • ~.. ~ I ." ~: :: ...
(v)
(iv)
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containing practical guidance tor visitors to the_Antarctic, ~ore
cOl1side~ed tor inclusion in Annex A of Recommendation VIII-9 but,
owing to lack of tiMe for full discussi~n, the matter ~a9 refe~red
to the Tenth Consultative Meet in6. The drafts are rep~duced
at Annex 6.
No action was takcQ to list or dcf i na areas ~r Spp.cial T~u=i~t
Interest for inclusion in Annex B of Rec~mcendation VIII-9.
13. Mon's impact on the Ant . ~ ~tic envir~nment
~it~ the items on the a genda concerning Antarctic reR0urcp~
particularly in mind, the Rer r esentntivcs discUS3Cd th~ quc3tion
of man's iopoct OD the Antarctic enyir0n~eDt. They recalled
the Dumerous steps already taken byC0~5ultativc Parties desig~ed
to protect the Antarctic environment from unne~es~a~ interference,
including:
(i) The designation by the Consultative Parties of the
Treaty Area as a Special Conservation Area nnd the
-adopt i on ~t the "Agr eed Measures for the ~Dserv8tion
of the Antarctic Fauna and ?l~raw.
(ii) The desi~ation of "Specially Protected Are3s" to
preserve their unique ec~logical system and "Sites
or Special Scientific Interest" to enable scientific
investigations to be carried out at th~se sites witb~ut
interference.
(iii) The negotiati?n of the Convention for the Con8crvoti~n
of Antarctic Seals (London 1972).
The adoption of measures to preserve aDd protect
rrOM damage historic monuwents situated in the
Antarctic Tre8~Y ~rea.
The ad0pti~n of a Code of G1nduct to be observed
at their stations and by their expeditions within
the Antarctic Treaty Area.
They also recall that in close co-operation with the
Sc i e n t i f i c Committee on ~ntarctic kese8~ch (~CAR) of the
Interna:ional Council of Sc i ent i f i c ~nions, and ttrouch
SC~ I.itb other appropriate international organisations
conce~ed, they have develored plans for the comprehensive
study of the Antarctic marine ecosyste~ considered as an
r
. -.
1~
.; .
11J .
/
integral part or the Antarctic enviro~cnt and h~;e
sought to:
(8) identity the tyoes and assess the extent ?:
buman interference which has occurred in the
Treaty area a8 a result of Mao's activities;
(b) 6sses~ the possible i~pact on the environmp.nt
of the Treaty Ar~3 and other dependent cc~cJ~t~~~
if mineral expl~ra~ion and/or exploitatior. fter~
to occur there.
The Representatives, while ~Q s i de r i D~ the next steps t~
be take::! ~:ith r ega r-d t~ qu e c t i o rr. c nc e i-n i ng Antarctic r e s ou r-ce s ,
~ecidad to ra~~m~end that ~heir ·~~e rnnc u~ ~ should rG~ffirm
their C'Jmmit::lcnt tr) envir~n"lE:ntB'!. pr-o t cc t i on , Acc'JrdinCly tl;1")
Representatives drew up the $tat~~cnt c0ntained in Rec0~mend~ti'ln
ll-5.
14. Activities in the Antarctic of other sta~es
This ~up.stion was wide17 discussed.
In connection with possible substantial or continuing activities
1n ~he ~~arctic Tr~aty "~ea by States that are not Cor-tracting
ra~ties 0: toe Treaty. the Representatives recalled their agreed
~ie~ expressed in the Final Report of the Seventh Antarctic Treaty
~?r~u]t~tive Mee~i~g that it would be advisable for Governments to
co~~ult to~ether a5 provided for by the Treaty and be ready to urge
or in7ite as B?propriate the State or States concerned to accede to
~r.~ ~re8t7t pointic~ out tte ri~hts and benefits they would receive
3cd ~l~o :he resrcnsibilities and obli~ations of Contracting Parties.
rCror~"tioc a~d docurnects of Consultative ~eetinfs
The 'It;e~tion of a va i Lab i Li.t y of information and doc urcent s to
~~~ ~ubllC W~D Jiscussed and it was gener311y a~reed that t~pre
e~~ul~ b~ increased efforts to ~ake both nore available to the
;:'.lblit: •
Re",i" '. of :: (~~servat:'on : :essu:-es and Si t es of ':[lPcial
, ; c i ~ r, : :' :' :.. c :r.terest
:he attention of Hep~esentatives ~as d~a~n to two erro~s in
, <',:c-,r."n1'ltions "i1 I I - 1 'Inc ": :;: : 1-4 r-es pec t i ve l y , The
it e j :- ";, e n t ~ t , v p ,, c ec io eo to c c r rec t r; ne Lat i cuc e r hovn on the ~p
attached to RecorD;Dendation V111-1 so as to read 660 _ 16' . S. -- The _
Representatives decided to remove the discrepancy between the
Management Plan tor Site of Special Scientific Interest 1m 6
(attached t~ Rec~~rDendati~n 'i111-4) and the attached cap by
substituting the word "three~ tor the w~rd ~rourn in secti0n (i)
of the r~nRgement Plan.
The Meeting c~nsidered the questi0n of the designation
of Marine Sites of Special Scientific Interest Dnd the opini0n
was expressed th~t SCAR should be invit~c to ~xn~ine this
~atter. In this connecti~n. Rerre s c n t~ t L v es ~0 t ed that the
~~.e rn=en ~ ~ ! Chile intended to pr0~o ~ e ~3 SCA2 . ~ol10wing aereed
procedures, two r~rine Sites of Speci3l Scientific Interest.
The United Sta~es Delegation suc~itted the foll0wing
information on its experience in Sites 0: Speci~l Ccientiflc
Interest :
Management plans tor seven Sites of Special Scientific
Interest (SSSI) were accepted as interim ~idellnes by
Recommendation VI11-4 in 1975. The 1976-77 a~5~r8l s~~r
provided the first opportunity to iocorp?rate these guid~liDes
iDto Antarctic operatiDB procedures.
The existing seven ss:;r expire June 30. 1981. which dnt"
is likely t~ occur betore the el~venth Co08ultative Meeting.
The US Antarctic Progra~ controls visits to 5551 by 9
permit system and has found this to he ao effective MeSDS
of reducing harmful interfereuce atS3ST 1, 2, ~ snd 4 durio~
the 1976-4977 operating sea son , 'The posting of iofo.nDatbo
si~s around SSS! has been a deterrent to unintend~
interference by tourists. During ~his initial year or
operati')ns, the US issued one p~r~it for 8cce~s to SSSI.
One request for access to SSSI 3 W~3 denie1 On ~uoda that
tbe propo~ed purp0se was in conflict with the r~r.3ge~eot PlA~
as set forth in Recommendation VIII-4.
1? Tenth CJnsultAtive Me~ting
Representatives accepted with pleu~ure the invitation ~f the
Represent~tive of the United Stctes to h)ld the ~ntb Consultativo
Meetiog i.n \....'lshiogton. l:JC i n 1979.
'.~
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IX - 2
ANTARCTIC l1.ARINE LIVING RESOURCES
The Representatives)
Recallin5 the special responsibilities conferred upon the
~nsultative parties in r~spect of the preservation and conserva~io~
of living resources in the Antarctic by virtue of Article IX
paragraph 1(f') of the Antarctic Treaty;
Recalling further the history of action taken by Consultative
Parties concerning conservation and protection of the Anta~ctic
ecosystem including, in particular, Recomcendations III-VIII,
VIII-10, VIII-13 and IX-5i
~otinG thae concencrations of marine living resources are
found in the Antarctic Treaty area and adjacent ~nters;
Aware of the need to compile more infor~ation with a view to
developing a good scientific foundation for appropriate con~ervation
measures and rational management policies for all kltarctic marine
living resources;
Recolinising the urge:.cy of ensuring that these resources are
protected.~ the establis~ent of sound conservation measures ~hich
will prevent overfishlng and protect the integrity of the Antarctic
ecosystem;
Concerned that interim guidelines for the protection and
Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources are desirable
until such time as a definitive re~i~e enters into force;
Convinced that provisio~ for effective measures to conserve
Ar.~~ctic marine living resources as well as for collection and
~r.qlYeiD of the data necessary to develop such measures will reGuirc
'. t, 1': ·:f.lrly conclusion of a definitive conservat.ion regi:ne;
k~r.omoend to their Governments that:
I
SCIEN~IFIC RESEARCH
1. To the greatest extent feasible, they cooperate broodly and
compre hens ively in scientific investigations, and in the
exchange of information therp.on, relating to the Antarctic
14
(a) the regime should explicitly re~ogni8e the prime
responsibilities of the Cons~ltative Parties in rela~io~
to the protection nnd conservation of the environoent in
the Antarctic Treaty area and the importance of the
measures recommended by the Consultative Parties to th~s
end;
t he provisions of Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty s~atl
not be affected by the regi~e. It should ensure th~~ t~~
principles e~bodied in Article 4 are safe~arded ir.
application to the ~arine areas south of GOO Sout~ latitu~~;
' ( f ) the regime should not apply to species already re~lated
pursuant to cxistinf, i~ternational agree~ents but s~ould
take into account the "elatio~ship of such speci~s to
those species covered by the regime.
(c)
'\ (d)
'--<e)
t he regime should provide for the effective conservatic~
of the marine livi~g resources of tbe A~tarctic ecosJ~tc~
as a whole;
the regime should cover the area of specific competence
of the Antarctic Treaty;
the regime should. however. extend north of 60 0 South
latitude where that is necessary Cor the effective
conservation of species of the Antarctic ecosystem,
without prejudice to constal state juri~diction in that
area;
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greed the Con s e vation
of Antarctic Fauna and Flora
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AGREED MEASURES }o'OIl 'l'HE COXSERVATro" OF
ANIl'A-R~l'NA A"n FLORA [']
The Representatives, taking into consideration Article IX. of the
Antarctic Treaty, and recalling Recommendation I-VIII of the F'irst
Consultative ~rl"eting and Rocommendut ion II-II of the Second
Consultative Meeting, recommend to their Governments that they
approve as soon us possible and implement without delay the annexed
··Agreed Mcasm·cs for the Conservation of Antarct ic Fauna and
Flom",
Preamble
The Governments participating in the Third Consultative ~reetill;:;
under Article IX. of the Anturctic Treaty,
De::;iring to implement the principles and purposes of the Antar..r ir-
Treaty j
U :!eogn ising the scientific Impcrtance of the study of Antarctic
fuu na and Ilorn, their adaptation to their rigorous environment, ant] -
their interr slarionsh ip with that environment:
Cons ide ring th . unique.nature of I hese fauna and flora, their circum-
polar nuige, and particularly their defencelessness and suscepti bility
to exte rm ina ion ;
Desiring by uitllel' international collabOration within the f ram-
work of th e Anta rctic Treaty to promote and achieve the objective,
of protection, scientific st udy, and rational use of these fauna. and
flora' and
Having parti ular regard to the conservation principl s developcd
by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the
International Council of Scientific Unions;
Hereby £21lii lor th Tronty .\.rea as a Special Conservation Area
ami have agreed on (he following meaSUrl':5 : - -
\ T» hp t'oll :--.id,'·rt'd ; 1 ... i nt r-ri tu ,~ l1 i l l l\ liIH'" in iH"t'lI rda tu'" wir h Ht'. -IHUIlII'IHhll i. '1I
111·-1 X. fiJI/I". p. ~,~,; .
Article I
1. These Agn'e(l ~reasures shall apply to the same area to which the
Antarctic Treat) is upplicuble (hereinafter referred to a" the
Treaty Area) namely the area south of GO° ~outh Latitude,
includiug all ice shelves,
However. nothing in t hesc .\gl"l'el] ~[I'asures shall projudice»r
in any way :tlfe,:! the ri!!!lb, or r he exorcise of till' rights, of all.1-
State under inn-runt ioua l !:L w wit h n'g:l I'll to t he high ;:,ea,; wirh ill
Article II
Article IV
Art iclo Y
Thn provisions o f these .\ g n'cll ~rpa';lIres shall not apply in ca ses of
«xt 1'l'/Il l ' p!lII'rg pll{'y ill\'oh-illg possible loss of human life 01" involvinz
r ill ' :' :I t'd .'" of sh ips 01" aircraft. t::>
TIAS 6058
a)
b)
C)
d)
e)
f )
the Treaty Area, or restrict the implementation of the provisions
of the Antarctic Treaty with respect to inspection"
2~The .\nnexes to these Agreed-~.(~as~~ shaii- f~rm an integraTP~t
thereof, and all references to the Agreed Measures shall be
considered to include the Annexes"
For the purposes of th ese Agreed :\fea::ures:
"Nat ive mammal" means any member, at any stage of its life
cycle, or any species belonging to the Class Mammalia
indigenous to the An ta rctie or occurring there through naturul
agencies of dispersa l ~ept ing whale . -
"uut ive bird" n a ils any mem ber, at :mrsrage of its life cycle
(illcluuing etrgs) , of any sp ecies of the Class Aves indigenous
to tho Antarct ic or OCCUlTing there through natural agencies
of dispersal;
"native plant" means any kind of vegetation at any stage of
its life cycle (i ncluding seeds), indigenous to th e An tarctic
or occurring tll re th rough nutural agencies of d ispersal ;
"appropria te author ity " means any perso n auth orised by a.
Participat ing Govern ment to issue permits un der these Agreed
Measures ;
"perm it ' mean a ormal p rmissio n in writing issued b an
appropriat I ri;y .
"parti ipating gO\ ernm nt" means any Government for which
these Agreed Measures have become effective in accorda nce
with Article XIII of these Ag~ • Ieasures,
Article III
Each Participating Government shall take appropriate action to
carry out the se Agreed ~feasures"
Tho Participating Governments shall prepare and circulate to
members of cxpedit ions and stat ions information to ensure under-
,; t a lld in~ uiul obse r va nce of the provisions of llll':'c Agreed ~Ieasures,
~ l' tt i ng fort h in particular prohibited act ivit ies, au .I prodding list s of
~ I" ' l' i :l l l y prot edeJ spec ies and spec iully prOl el't l'" arcus.
I." 1I1l l 0 .; ,;" h i
,1
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Article VI
1. Each Partieiputill~ Gm"i-I:nment sTIallpn>1IilJit-within the T n":try
Area the killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of any nali\"l~
ma mm al or nnt ive bird, or any attempt at any such act, except in
accordance with a permit.
2" Sucl: permits shall I.Hl drawn in terms as specific as possible and
iSSIll'l1 only for the following pnrposes:
a) to pro\'id~.intlispensable rood fo-~ men or dogs in the Treaty
Area in limited llUi~ntit.i\'s,:tnli in conformity with the pur-
P05CS and principles of these Agrel'd ~Icasures;
b) to prO\"ide specimens for scientific study or scientific
in formation;
c) to provide specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or
other educational or cultural institutions or uses.
3_ Permits for Specially Protected Areas shall be issued only in
accordance with the provisions of Article VIII.
4. Participating Governments shan limi t. the issu of such permits
so ' to ensur as far as possible tha :
a) no more nat ive mammals or birds are k illed or taken in any
j'e:J.r than can normally be re pl aced by natural rep roduction
in, the foil wing breeding 5C.'l.SOD ;
b) th va rie y of species and he ba ance 0 the natural ecologica
systems e isting within the T aty A.rc:J. . re maintained .
5. The species of nat ive mammal s and birds l isted in Annex: .A of
these )[eas ure" shall be designa ted pecially P rotected S pecies "
and shall be accorded specia l p ro tection by P articipating
Governments,
G. A Participating Government shall not authorise an appropriate
authority to issue n permit with respect to a Specially Protected
Species except. in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article.
7, .\. permit may be issued under this Art icle with respect to a
Sp('ci:t1ly Protected Species, provided that :
:1) ' l is issued for a compclfing scientific purpose, and;
I,) Il le actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the
. · ;,.i,.; ~ i n~ nn t uru] ('('olog ica l ;;y"ll'm or tlte surviva l of that
,, !H'<' IC;;.
Art ielc YH
1. 1-::1<'11 Part icipat iJlg Govcrnmeut shall take appropriate measures
ttl iuiuimize luumful inter ference within the Treatv Aroa with the
norm.tl living ru nd it ious o f allY nut ive n uunrna l ~I' bird, or any
TL\S ell.;S II
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attempt at such harmful interferen ce, except as permitted under
Article VI.
2.- -T he following acts. and acti vities shall J)e_con~iuered as h:~rm:.....r_lI_I__.
interference:
a) allowing dogs to run free;
b) flying helicopters or other aircraft in a manner whi ch would
unnecessarily disturb bird and sea l concentrations, or landing
close to such concentrations (e.g. within 200 metres) ;
c) driving vehicles unnecessarily close to concent rations of birds
and seals (e.g. within 200 metres) ;
d) use of explosives close to concent rations of birds and seals;
e) di scharge of firearms close to bird and seal concentrations
(e.g. within 300 metres);
f) any disturbance of bird and seal colonies during the breed ing
period by persistent attention from persons on foot .
However, the above act ivities, with the exception of those
mentioned in a) and e) may be permitted to the minimum extent
necessa ry for the estaLlishment, supply and operation of sta tio ns.
3. Each P articipatin g Govern ment shall take a ll reasona le steps
towards the alleviation of pollution of th e waters adjacent to the
coast an d ice shelves.
9ii~~~Art icle YID
The areas of outstanding scientifi interest l isted in nnex n shall
be des igna ted ' Specially Protected reo and shall accor ed
special protection by the Participating Govern ments in order to
preserve their unique natura l ecologi I system.
2. In addit ion to the proh ibitions an d measures of p ro tect ion deal t
with in other Articles of these Agreed ~[e:lSUre5, the Participating
Governments shall in Specially Protected Areas further prohibit :
a) the collection of any nat ive plant, except in nccordnnce with
a permit;
b) the driving of any vehicle.
3. A permit issued under Article YI shall not have effect within a
S pec ially Protected Area excep t in accordance with paragraph t
of th e present Article.
4. A permit shnll have effect within a Spec ia llv Protect ed Ar ea
provided that : .
:I) it was issued for a compe lling scienti fic purpose which ca nnot
be served elsewhcre : und
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Article XII
1. The Participating Governments may make such arrangements :IS
may be necessary for the discussion of such matters as :
a ) th e collecti on and excha nge o f record" (including" records of
permits) un-I st ut ist ies couevrn ing the numbers of cuch spec ies
Ilf nut ive mununa l :lUU bird k ilh«] or ":lIJlllred au uu.rllv ill the
Treaty Area ; .
Each Participating Government whose expeditions use ships sail-
ing under flags of nationalities other than its own shall, as far as
feasible, arrange with the owners of such ships that the crews of these
ships observe these Agreed :\feusures.
-- - - b) --._the actions permitted thereunder will not jeopardise the
natural ecological systeiuexisfing in that Area.- - - - . --_
Article IX
1. Each Participating Government shall prohibit the bringing into
the Treaty Area of any species of animal or plant not indigenous
to that Area, except in accordance with a pennit.
2. Permits under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be drawn in terms
as specific as possible and sha ll be issued to allow the importat inn
only of the animals and plants listed in Annex C. W hen any such
animal or plant might cause harmful interference with the natural
system if IAt unsupervised within the Treaty Area, such permits
_ shall require that it be kept under controlled conditions and, after
it has served its purpose, it shall be removed from the Treaty Area
or destroyed.
3. Nothing in paragraphs 1 and ~ of this Article sh all apply to the
importation of food into the Treaty Are:l. so long as animals and
pl a nts used for this purpose are kept under controlled conditions.
4. ach P art icipating Go vernment un dertakes to ensure that all
reasonable precautions shall taken to prevent the a ident al
introduction of pa rasites and diseuses into the Treaty Area . In
particular, the p re au t ions listed in Anne ' D sh 11 be taken.
A rt icl
E ach Pn icipat ing Gove rnment undertakes to exert appropriate
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the Uni ted Nations, to the end
that no on engages in any activity in the T reaty Area contrary to
the principles or purposes of these Agreed ~reasures.
Article XI
-L) the obtainiusr nnd cxclumgc o f iufurtuut ion as to the status of
native mam~als and birds ill tJ!I:l_Trc.uty Area,..aIHLthe exterit - -- -
~ - to which :iny species needs protection;
c) the number of native mammals or birds which should be
permitted to be harvested for food, scientific study, or other
uses in the var-ious regions;
d) the establishment of a common form in which this informa-
tion shall be submitted Ly P urt iciputing Govcrnruents in
uccordance with paragraph 2 of thi s Article,
2. Each Participating Government shall inform the other Govern-
ments in writing before the end of November of ea ch year of the
steps taken and information collected in the preceding period of
July 1st to June 30th relating to the implementation of these
Agreed ~Ieasures. Governments exchanging information under
paragraph 5 of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty may at the
same tim e transmit the information relating to the implementation
of these Agreed Measures.
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Article XIV
1. These Agreed ~Ieasuresmay be amended at any time by unanimous
agre('ment of the Governments whose Representatives are entitled
!? participate in meetings under Article IX of the Antarctic
l'rcnry.
Article XIII
1. After the receipt by the Go vernment des ignated in Recommenda-
tio n I-XI (5 ) of not ification of approval by all GO~'ernmen
whose representatives a re entitled to participate III meet ings p ro-
vided for under Article I X of the Anta rct ic Treaty, these Agreed
easures shall become effect! for those Governmen .
2. T hereafte r any ot er COntractmg Party to the An nrc ic T reaty
may, in consonance wi th the purposes of R ecommendat ion
III-VII, accept these Agreed ~rensures by notifying the desig-
nated Go vernment of i ts in tent ion to apply the Ag re Ieasures
and to be bound by them. The Agreed Measures shall become
effective with regard to such Governments on the date of receipt
of such notification.
3. The designated Government shall inform the Governments re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 of this Article of each notification of
approvnl, the effective date of these Agreed :\Ieasures and of each
notification of acceptance. The designated. Government shall also
inform any Government which has accepted these Agreed :\Ieas-
ures of each subsequent notification of acceptance.
L
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Annex n
An nex A
Spei~ial1.r protect l'tl species
ANNEXES TO THESE AGREED MEASURES
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Specially protected areas
Annex C
Tn:e_~rtation of animals and plauts
The following animal" and plants may be imported into the
Treaty Arou in accordance with permits issued under Article IX
(~) of th ese Agreed )feasures :
a) sledge dogs;
I.) dllllll',;1 ic animals nrul plants;
,,) laboratory unimnls un .I plants.
2. The Annexes, in particular, may be amended as necessary through
diplomut ic .chunnels. _
3. An amendment proposed through diplomatic channels shall he
submitted in writing to the designated Government which shall
communicate it to the Governments referred to in paragraph 1. of
the present Article for npproval ; at the same time, it shall be
communicated to the other Participating Governments.
·t Any amendment shall become etlcct ive on the date on whi ch
notifications of approval have been received by the designated
Government from ull of the Governments referred to in paragraph
1. of this article.
5. The designated Government shall notify those same Governmcnj-,
of the date of receipt of each approval communicated to it and the
date on which the amendment will become effective for them.
6. Such amendment shall become effective on that same date for all
other Participating Governments, except those which before the
expiry of two months after that date notify the designated GO\'-
ernment that they d not accept it.
TL\S 60::;S
Annex n
Precautions to prevent accidental introdud ion of parasi.tes and _
di5easl's into the Treaty Area
[SE.-\L]
Each dog shall be inoculated at least two months before the
time of its arrival in the Treaty Area. .
Poultry: Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX (3) of
these Agreed Measurcs, no living poult ry shall be
brought into the 'I'reutyArea after July 1st 1966.
c:a.... utli l£. c....,.. rao 4 . ,.
• .. par'"~. 1'4I. ....i OA no.
It' d . T' ... • r &",tu ',
8r .. &. , \ . \. ... '~''''
C,-' f ...,
~al~~CTrV'"
_IC_ ...... A. ~ ..
Al .. E~_ • .."
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The following precautions shall be taken:
1. Dogs: All dogs imported into the Treaty Area shall be inoculated
against the following di seuses :
a) distemper;
b) contagious can ine hepatitis;
c) rabies
d) leptospirosis (L. canicola and L. icterohaemor-
rhagk:w) .
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